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PROPERTY-THE LIMITS OF EQUITY: FORFEITURE, DOUBLE
JEOPARDY, AND THE MASSACHUSETTS "SLAYER STATUTE"

Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are
called great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping the
law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate over
whelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the
judgment. 1
INTRODUCTION

In December 2002 the Massachusetts legislature approved a
law entitled "Taking from deceased victim's estate prohibited."2
This law prohibits any person convicted of the unlawful killing of
another from taking through distribution and disposition from the
victim's estate. 3 To achieve this goal, the drafters employed the le
gal fiction that the person convicted of unlawfully killing the dece
dent is deemed to have predeceased the victim. 4 The statute
applies this fiction for property held between the convicted killer
and the decedent in joint tenancy or in tenancy by the entirety as
well as to property inheritable by will or intestacy.s
This law, which became effective on March 24, 2003, is the
most recent legislative expression of the "slayer rule."6 The slayer
rule, based on the equitable principle that individuals should not
profit from their wrongful acts, bars a slayer from taking the prop
erty of his victim or benefitting in any way from his victim's prema
ture death.?
1. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197,400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
2. An Act Relative to the Descent and Distribution of Property, ch. 420, 2002
Mass. Acts 1195, 1196-97 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 46 (2006».
3. [d.
4. See id.
5. [d.
6. The "slayer rule" is the name given to the equitable common law maxim that
"[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own
wrong" when it is applied to murderers. The most famous expression of the slayer rule
is in Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. 1889).
7. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 8.4 (2003).
159
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In 2002 Massachusetts was one of the last states to weigh in on
the slayer issue statutorily.s Although the Massachusetts statute is
similar to other state provisions attempting to address the problem
of the slayer and his bounty, the approach taken by Massachusetts
differs markedly in one key respectY Deeming murderous joint te
nants and tenants by the entirety to have legally predeceased the
decedent implicates constitutional concerns that other states have
carefully avoided for more than a century.l° As applied to joint
tenancies and tenancies by the entirety, the Massachusetts slayer
statute is overinclusive in relation to its purported goal of prevent
ing a felon from profiting from a crime and results in an impermissi
ble forfeiture of the estate as a result of a criminal conviction.
Moreover, due to the clear punitive character of such a divestiture,
the statute also violates the bar against double jeopardy guaranteed
under the Fifthll and Fourteenth12 Amendments to the United
States Constitution, as well as the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights. 13
This Note analyzes the ways in which the Massachusetts statute
is a drastic departure from other state's slayer statutes. 14 It identi
8. See id. § 8.4 reporter's note (listing forty-four states that had some form of
slayer statute in place before Massachusetts enacted its law in 2002).
9. The Massachusetts statute's de facto requirement of forfeiture of vested inter
ests, while not without precedent, has been nearly unanimously rejected. See William
M. McGovern, Jr., Homicide and Succession to Property, 68 MICH. L. REV. 65, 86
(1969) ("All authorities agree . . . that the murderer should be allowed to keep
whatever right he may have during his lifetime to the income from the property, since
that interest is not acquired because of the crime.").
10. See generally John W. Wade, Acquisition of Property by Willfully Killing An
other-A Statutory Solution, 49 HARV. L. REV. 715 (1936).
1l. U.S. CaNsT. amend. V ("[N]or shall any person be subject for the same of
fense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ....").
12. Id. amend. XIV, § 1; Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969) (holding
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
incorporated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment and made it en
forceable against the states).
13. Luk v. Commonwealth, 658 N.E.2d 664, 666 n.3 (Mass. 1995) ("Although not
expressly included in the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, the prohibition against
double jeopardy has long been recognized as part of our common and statutory law.");
see also MASS. CaNST. pt. 1, art. XII ("[N]o subject shall be arrested, imprisoned, de
spoiled, or deprived of his property, immunities, or privileges, put out of the protection
of the law, exiled, or deprived of his life, liberty, or estate, but by the judgment of his
peers, or the law of the land." (emphasis added».
14. Since adoption of the Massachusetts statute, the North Dakota legislature
amended its analogous statute to void the vested property interests of joint tenants
convicted of an unlawful killing. See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 30.1-10-03(3) (Supp.
2007) ("The intentional and felonious killing of the decedent ... (b) Voids the interests
of the killer in property held with the decedent at the time of the killing as joint tenants
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fies the ways in which the statute differs and concludes that these
differences violate rights guaranteed by the Massachusetts and
United States Constitutions. As drafted, the Massachusetts statute
goes far beyond the traditional goal of the slayer rule-preventing
the perpetrator of a crime from acquiring his victim's property.1S
Rather, when applied to joint tenants and tenants by the entirety, it
divests a perpetrator of property in which he has a vested and
preexistent legal interest.1 6 In passing such a law, the drafters ig
nored more than a century of case law from other jurisdictions that
carefully balanced the need to honor the interests that citizens have
in their property with the indisputable moral justification for deny
ing slayers the right to succeed to their victims' property.17 As
such, the legislature was uninfluenced by the historical understand
ing that it is both unconscionable to allow a slayer to profit from his
wrongful acts and unconstitutional to take away from the slayer any
property interest that he already owns without due process of law. 18
Part I of this Note presents the roots of the slayer quandary
from the ancient common law writs of attainder through the early
American abolition of the slayer rule. Part II reviews the first com
mon law approaches to the slayer problem and the modern-day
controversy regarding the constitutionality of slayer statutes. Part
III considers the response taken by state legislatures, in the face of
perceived inaction by the courts, to protect victims of crimes and
with the right of survivorship."). While no appellate court has had the opportunity to
scrutinize the new law, this move has been criticized by at least one commentator. See
generally Bradley Myers, The New North Dakota Slayer Statute: Does It Cause a Crimi
nal Forfeiture?, 83 N.D. L. REV. 997 (2007).
15. "Nullus commodum capere pOlest de injuria sua propria," the common law
equitable maxim that no one shall be allowed to profit by his own wrong, is the organiz
ing principle behind nearly all slayer rules and statutes. HERBERT BROOM, A SELEC
TION OF LEGAL MAXIMS 279 (Philadelphia, T. & J. W. Johnson & Co. 1882) (1845); see
also Estate of Foleno ex rei. Thomas v. Estate of Foleno, 772 N.E.2d 490, 494 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2002); Neiman v. Hurff, 93 A.2d 345, 347 (N.J. 1952); Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E.
188,190 (N.Y. 1889); Gedlen v. Safran (In re Estate of Safran), 306 N.W.2d 27, 29 (Wis.
1981); Wade, supra note 10, at 715.
16. This directly contradicts the widely recognized principle that under a constitu
tional slayer statute "the murderer will not be deprived of property to which he would
otherwise be entitled"; he simply "will not be entitled to profit by the murder." RE
STATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION: QUASI CONTRACTS & CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS
§ 188 cmt. a (1937).
17. Wade, supra note 10, at 725-26. In his very influential early model slayer
statute Professor Wade made clear that "[e]ach state will also find it necessary to con
sider the exact nature of the interests which it is including. If the interest is one which
has already vested, it cannot be taken away without violating the constitutional provi
sions as to forfeiture of estates." Id.
18. Id.
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their heirs. This Part also examines the relevance of the right of
survivorship that characterizes joint tenancies and tenancies by the
entirety, and explains why these types of estates have presented
particular problems for legislatures seeking to advance equitable
ends. Part III concludes by surveying the different state and judi
cial approaches to the slayer rule in the context of these more diffi
cult types of property interests, as well as model solutions contained
in the Uniform Probate Code 19 and the Restatement of Restitution. 20
Part IV examines the construction of the Massachusetts slayer stat
ute, and Part V analyzes the vulnerability of Massachusetts's ap
proach to constitutional challenges.
I.

A.

HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE SLAYER ISSUE

Feudalism and Bills of Attainder: Forfeiture of Estate,
Corruption of Blood, and Civil Death

At ancient common law, any ability of a killer to inherit from
his victim was precluded by operation of law through the doctrine
of attainder. 21 Under this doctrine, a person convicted of a capital
offense, including murder, was placed into a state of attainder as an
immediate consequence of his conviction. 22 The consequences of
such placement included forfeiture of the guilty person's property
to the King and corruption of the perpetrator's blood. 23 The doc
trine of forfeiture required the complete divestiture of a wrong
doer's real and personal property and was considered part of the
punishment for the offense committed. 24 Corruption of blood was
a feudal doctrine that transferred the condemnation of the attained
person to his heirs, "unto the remotest generation."25 The effect of
this intergenerational condemnation was that a wrongdoer was pre
19. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803 (amended 1997), 8 U.L.A. 58-59 (Supp. 2008).
20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 8.4 (2003).
21. Alison Reppy, The Slayer's Bounty-History of Problem in Anglo-American
Law, 19 N.Y.U. L.Q. REv. 229, 241 (1942) (noting that prior to the rejection of criminal
forfeitures, "the doctrine of attainder, forfeiture, corruption of blood and escheat ...
constituted a fairly satisfactory . . . solution to the problem of the slayer and his
bounty").
22. Id. at 231.
23. [d.
24. [d. at 232-33.
25. [d. at 233. Corruption of blood was part of the ancient English penalty for a
felony. [d. The corruption of blood would forbid the accused's family from inheriting
his property. [d. Such bills and punishments were often inflicted upon Tories by the
colonial government immediately following independence. See, e.g., United States v.
Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 441-42 (1965).
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vented from conveying, and his heirs from taking, any property
through descent or distribution. 26 The doctrine of attainder, while
certainly cruel, made moot the social, ethical, and legal concerns
raised when a person kills another and stands to inherit from his
victim. 27 A person who can neither hold, nor devise, nor inherit
property is incapable of profiting, vis-a-vis inheritance of property,
from his wrong.

B.

Early American Jurisprudence: The Abolition of Attainder
and the Emergence of the "Slayer Problem"

Regardless of their rarified salutary effect, these doctrines fell
out of favor in Anglo-American jurisprudence and, over time, were
increasingly rejected as undemocratic and archaic features of a feu
dal past. 28 In the United States,29 the attendant conditions of at
tainder were abolished by the Constitution of 1789. 30 Explicit
prohibitions were also included in the majority of state constitu
tions. 31 While the injustices of attainder were unquestionable and
26. Reppy, supra note 21, at 234 ("[A] person attainted is neither allowed to re
tain his former estate nor to inherit a future one, nor to transmit any inheritance to his
issue ... for his inheritable blood, which is necessary either to hold, [or] to take ... is
blotted out, corrupted and extinguished forever ...." (quoting 2 WILLIAM BLACK
STONE, COMMENTARIES *255».
27. Id. at 238 (noting a near complete absence of case law discussing the issue of
the slayer and his bounty prior to the statutory abolition of attainder).
28. Id. at 234 (observing the connection between the breakdown of feudal power
and a growing ill regard towards the consequences of attainder).
29. See id. at 234-38.
30. Id. at 244; see, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex
post facto Law shall be passed."); id. art. III, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power
to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corrup
tion of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted."). It is
important to note that some of the colonies, including Massachusetts, had expressly
abrogated these doctrines well before the 1787 signing of the U.S. Constitution. Cecil
Greek, Drug Control and Asset Seizures: A Review of the History of Forfeiture in En
gland and Colonial America, in DRUGS, CRIME, AND SOCIAL POLICY: RESEARCH, Is·
SUES, AND CONCERNS 109, 119 (Thomas Mieczkowski ed., 1992) (noting that
"Massachusetts abolished escheats and forfeiture consequent to attainder in its 'The
Body of Liberties of 1641''').
31. See, e.g., ALA. CaNST. art. I, § 19; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 15; ARIZ. CaNST.
art. 2, § 16; CAL. CaNST. art. I, § 9; COLO. CaNST. art. II, § 9; CONN. CaNsT. art. IX, § 4;
DEL. CaNsT. art. I, § 15; FLA. CaNST. art. I, § 17; GA. CaNST. art. I, § 1, 'II XX; ILL.
CaNST. art. I, § 11; IND. CaNsT. art. I, § 30; KAN. CaNsT. Bill of Rights, § 12; Ky.
CaNsT. Bill of Rights, § 20; ME. CaNsT. art I, § 11; MD. CaNsT. Dec. of Rights art. 27;
MICH. CaNST. art. I, § 10; MINN. CaNsT. art. I, § 11; Mo. CaNsT. art. I, § 30; MONT.
CaNsT. art. II, § 30; NEB. CaNST. art. I, §§ 15-16; N.C. CaNsT. art. I, § 29; OHIO CaNST.
art I, § 12; OKLA. CaNST. art. II, § 15; OR. CaNST. art. I, § 25; PA. CaNsT. art. I, §§ 18
19; S.c. CaNsT. art. I, § 4; TENN. CaNsT. art. I, § 12; TEX. CaNsT. art. I, § 21; WASH.
CaNST. art. I, § 15; W. VA. CaNsT. art. III, § 18; WIS. CaNST. art I, § 12.

164

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:159

the necessity of protection from those injustices was evident,32 the
abolition of the doctrines of attainder, forfeiture, and corruption of
blood made it possible for a killer to inherit from his victim. 33
This result is largely attributable to the fact that descent and
distribution were exclusively controlled by operation of property
law. 34 While inheritance through murder committed by one who
stands to take property from the victim "is repugnant to all sense of
justice,"35 the law of property has no inherent protections against
this eventuality.36 Moreover, the law of inheritance in the United
States tends to be statutory, and a strict construction of early inheri
tance statutes explicitly providing the mechanisms for descent and
distribution actually precluded any result other than allowing a
killer to take. 37
This conflict between law and equity has been variously re
ferred to as the problem of the "slayer and his bounty"38 or the
problem of the "murderous heir."39 For the purpose of this Note, it
shall simply be referred to as the slayer problem. Various solutions
32. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN TIlE CONSTITUTION OF
1787, at 97 (1956) (regarding as fortunate that an "indulgent attitude" toward Black
stone's blase attitude toward the injustices of attainder "was not shared by the Philadel
phia Convention").
33. See Estate of Foleno ex rei. Thomas v. Estate of Foleno, 772 N.E.2d 490, 494
(Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that, although cruel, attainder "provided one unintended
benefit: separating a killer from his victim's property," and that its abolition left "an
unanticipated void").
34. HERBERT THORNDIKE TiFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL .PROPERTY AND OTHER
INTERESTS IN LAND § 623, at 560 (Renard Berman ed., Callaghan & Co. abr. 3d ed.
1970) (1903).
35. Wade, supra note 10, at 715.
36. TIFFANY, supra note 34 (noting that under traditional property law, "[t]he
devisee or heir [who commits murder] is generally allowed to take [from his victim] as
in any other case").
37. Under a strict constructionalist approach, an equitable solution that under
mined the operation of existing statutes would be verboten because such action would
be a judicial preemption of expressed legislative will. See Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188,
191 (N.Y. 1889) (Gray, J., dissenting). Judge Gray, in his dissenting opinion, stated that
[w]e are bound by the rigid rules of law, which have been established by the
legislature, and within the limits of which the determination of this question is
confined. The question we are dealing with is whether a testamentary disposi
tion can be altered, or a will revoked, after the testator's death, through an
appeal to the courts, when the legislature has by its enactments prescribed
exactly when and how wills may be made, altered, and revoked, and appar
ently, as it seems to me, when they have been fully complied with, has left no
room for the exercise of an equitable jurisdiction by courts over such matters.
Id.
38. See Reppy, supra note 21, at 229.
39. See Daniel A. Farber, Courts, Statutes, and Public Policy: The Case of the
Murderous Heir, 53 SMU L. REV. 31 (2000).
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to the slayer problem have been offered by courts and legislatures
as well as by commentators40 and the American Law Institute. 41
These approaches will be discussed in Parts II and III.
II.
A.

COMMON LAW ANALYSIS OF THE SLAYER PROBLEM

Early Judicial Conservatism and Reluctance to Take a Lead

A substantial number of early decisions addressing the slayer
problem upheld the ability of a slayer to take from his victim
through descent and distribution. 42 Courts, with varying degrees of
regret and apprehension, held that under existing statutory
schemes, a slayer was entitled to take as in any other case. 43 Con
scious of the threat of unchecked punitive forfeitures that could re
sult from depriving a person, even a convicted murderer, of his
property for commission of a crime, courts avoided this possibility
by adopting a conservative and textualist approach in deciding
these early cases. 44 Indeed, there were a number of reasons under
lying this conservative approach. In addition to a desire to avoid
the troublesome constitutional forfeiture issues that would be
raised by denying a slayer's right to inherit,45 courts were reluctant
to use their equitable powers to override statutes that clearly and
unambiguously expressed legislative intent relating to wills and to
descent.46 Moreover, courts refused to deny a slayer his ability to
40. See generally Wade, supra note 10.
41. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 8.4 (2003); VNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803 (amended 1997), 8 V.L.A. 58-59 (Supp.
2008).
42. 5 HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1378, at
220 (Basil Jones ed., Callaghan & Co. 3d ed. 1939) (1920).
43. See id.; see also Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 106 N.E. 785, 790 (Ill. 1914) (In light of
unambiguous statutes, "whether [the ordinary application of the laws of descent] ac
cords with natural right and justice is not for the courts to decide."); McAllister v. Fair,
84 P. 112, 115 (Kan. 1906) (admitting that while impermissible, "a theory cutting a mur
derer out of any benefits resulting from his crime appeals to the court's sense of
justice").
44. See 5 TIFFANY, supra note 42, § 1378, at 220; J. David Walsh, Note, Dece
dents' Estates-Forfeitures of Property Rights by Slayers, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 448,
460-61 (1976).
45. Walsh, supra note 44, at 460-61; see also McAllister, 84 P. at 113 (It is not
"easy to attribute to the Legislature an intention to take from a criminal the right to
inherit as a consequence of his crime, since the Constitution provides that no conviction
shall work a corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate.").
46. See Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 191 (N.Y. 1889) (Gray, J., dissenting); 5
TIFFANY, supra note 42, § 1378, at 220-21.
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inherit because to do so would be an additional punitive measure
on top of the sentence normally given for the killing itself.47
B.

Riggs v. Palmer: A Common Law Attempt to Articulate an
Equitable Solution

The first attempt to directly confront these issues and fill this
equitable void was not made until the end of the nineteenth cen
tury.48 Riggs v. Palmer was the first, and certainly the most influen
tial, court decision in the United States attempting to equitably
solve the slayer problem by use of the common law. 49
In Riggs, a grandson killed his grandfather by poisoning him.50
Upon his grandfather's death, the murderous grandson stood to in
herit through his victim's will. 51 In this case, the sole issue faced by
the court was whether or not the grandson could have his inheri
tance. 52 At the outset of its analysis, the court recognized that, un
less the effect could in some way be "controlled or modified," a
literal construction of the applicable state probate statutes would
deliver the property to the grandson. 53 Eschewing both precedent
and controlling canons of statutory construction, grounding its anal
ysis in the works of Bacon and Blackstone, and looking to Aristotle
for Latin roots, the court found that an "equitable construction" of
the existing statutes could serve as just such a means of modifica
tion. 54 Justice Earl, speaking for the majority, dispensed with the
issues of legislative provincialism by concluding that, since the legis
lature could not have intended the result compelled by the existing
statutes, such a result could be excluded. 55 Thus, equitable con
47. 5 TIFFANY, supra note 42, § 1378, at 221; see also Wall, 106 N.B. at 789-90
(noting that the punishment for murder is fixed in the criminal code and does not in
clude a forfeiture of the right to inherit and, therefore, holding that it is not for the
court to impose such a penalty).
48. Reppy, supra note 21, at 245-50. Actually, this attempt fell quite early in the
controversy. See Farber, supra note 39, at 33 (explaining that while it may seem surpris
ing, the issue of the slayer's ability to inherit from his victim was never addressed by the
courts until shortly before the Riggs case in 1889).
49. Riggs, 22 N.B. 188.
50. Id. at 189.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. (citing 9 MA1TIiEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW (Phila.,
Thomas Davis 1846); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *91); see also id. (quot
ing BACON, supra, at 248 ("By an equitable construction a case not within the letter of a
statute is sometimes holden to be within the meaning, because it is within the mischief
for which a remedy is provided." (internal quotation marks omitted».
55. [d. at 190.
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struction of existing statutes would allow the court to effectively
bypass those provisions that demanded a seemingly unjust result. 56
Now, no longer "troubled by the general language contained in
the laws,"57 the Riggs court was free to implement the second tier
of its analysis-to articulate a more equitable solution to the slayer
problem. It did so by invoking the common law maxim that "[n]o
one should be permitted to profit by his own ... wrong."58 The
court made much of what it saw as the nearly transcendent legal
force of this maxim, reasoning that no statute was needed to give it
force. 59 In support of this proposition, the court pointed to an ap
plication of this maxim by the United States Supreme Court in its
decision in New York Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Armstrong. 60 In
that unanimous decision, the Court held that a beneficiary who
murdered the insured forfeited all rights to collect under an insur
ance policy.6l In so deciding, Justice Field stated that "[i]t would be
a reproach to the jurisprudence of the country" to allow the princi
ple underlying this maxim to be violated. 62 Permitting a slayer to
succeed to the property, the Riggs court reasoned, would be analo
gous to allowing an arsonist to collect on a fire insurance contract.
63 Preventing this outcome through the application of a common
law maxim would be merely akin to the nullification of a will for
fraud.64 The appropriate result was clear to the court-if the de
mands of equity are to be heeded, the grandson must be barred
from taking under his grandfather's Will. 65
In the third prong of its analysis, the court, rather summarily,
dispensed with concerns that denying the slayer succession would
either submit him to a greater punishment than the law specified or
56.
57.

/d.

Id.

58. The full weight of the court's rationale is clear from its complete language:
[A]ll laws, as well as all contracts, may be controlled in their operation and
effect by general, fundamental maxims of the common law. No one shall be
permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or
to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own
crime. These maxims are dictated by public policy, have their foundation in
universal law administered in all civilized countries, and have nowhere been
superseded by statutes.
Id.
59.

Id.

60. N.Y. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591, 600 (1886).
61. Id. at 600.
62. Riggs, 22 N.E. at 190 (citing Armstrong, 117 U.S. at 600).
63.
64.

65.

Id.
Id.
Id. (invalidating the will as void).
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work a forfeiture for a crime. 66 The majority stated that its decision
"does not inflict ... any greater or other punishment for his crime
than the law specifies. It takes from him no property, but simply
holds that he shall not acquire property by his crime .... "67
In a passionate dissent, Justice Gray argued that the majority
drastically overstepped its proper judicial role. 68 Focusing on the
primacy of the legislature, he argued that "the courts are not em
powered to institute such a system of remedial justice. "69 Addition
ally, he claimed that any bar to property is an additional criminal
punishment impermissibly doled out by the court.7°
In the final analysis, the influence of the Riggs court's solution
to the slayer problem has likely been more inspirational than prece
dential.7 1 The reasoning in Riggs-in particular the "equitable con
struction" upon which the majority bases the first prong of its
decision-has been attacked by many commentators.?2 Indeed, af
ter the Riggs decision, courts in many jurisdictions dismissed the
majority's holding as impermissible legislation by the courtS.?3 On
this issue, the dissent's focus on the primacy of the legislature was
ultimately more resonant.7 4 Nevertheless, the majority's expression
66.
67.

Id.
Id.
68. Id. at 191-92 (Gray, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 192.
70. Id. at 193 (writing that the courts are barred from "enhanc[ing] the pains,
penalties, and forfeitures provided by law for the punishment of crime").
71. Gregory C. Blackwell, Comment, Property: Creating a Slayer Statute
Oklahomans Can Live With, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 143, 148 (2004) ("Riggs triggered the
question of what to do with a slayer and his bounty .... [Yet, i]n the myriad of slayer
cases that followed Riggs, only a few jurisdictions followed New York's lead.").
72. Reppy, supra note 21, at 251 (arguing that the "reasoning of Judge Earl has
been severely criticized and cannot be supported"); see also Farber, supra note 39, at
33. Farber argues that the Riggs decision was made with the absence of controlling
precedent. Id. While the court cited the Supreme Court's decision in Armstrong to
bolster its argument that the force of common law maxims can carry the day, they did
so without mentioning either that the issue raised in Armstrong was essentially one of
contract law or that the case was decided in the absence of an applicable statute and
was therefore a case purely applying common law. Id. at 34.
73. Julie J. OIenn, Comment, 'Til Death Do Us Part: New York's Slayer Rule and
In re Estates of Covert, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 1341, 1345-46, 1346 n.21 (2001). This is not to
say that the Riggs majority stood completely alone. See Wade, supra note 10, at 716
n.12 (observing that a "respectable" minority of courts also found a way to prevent title
from passing to the slayer).
74. See McAllister v. Fair, 84 P. 112,113 (Kan. 1906) ("[T]he function of changing
a law because it works unjustly or oppressively belongs to the Legislature, and for a
court to ingraft an exception upon a statute would be judicial legislation."); Shellen
berger v. Ransom, 59 N.W. 935, 941 (Neb. 1894) (rejecting the decision in Riggs as a
"manifest assertion of a wisdom believed to be superior to that of the legislature upon a
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of what has become known as the "slayer rule"75 has been undenia
bly influential in American jurisprudence.?6 This maxim has be
come the overarching orgamzmg principle for legislatures
throughout the country to attempt their own solutions to the slayer
problem.?7

III.

THE RESPONSE OF STATE LEGISLATURES

Throughout the common law controversy surrounding the
slayer problem, many courts, especially those declining to disregard
existing statutes for the sake of equitable principles, suggested that
a statutory solution may be possible.?8 A statutory solution to the
slayer problem is appealing because it renders moot the "unwar
ranted judicial legislation" concerns of the Riggs dissent and other
courtS.79 Obviation of this portion of the controversy alone would
seem to make a legislative solution desirable. 80 Indeed, state legis
latures immediately began to accept these invitations when of
fered,81 or to respond to judicial inaction when they were not,
question of policy"); In re Carpenter's Estate, 32 A. 637, 638 (Penn. 1895) (noting that
the Riggs case was decided by a divided court and following the dissent in stating that
evil consequences of a law "can only be avoided by a change of the law itself, to be
effected by legislative, and not judicial, action").
75. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANS
FERS § 8.4 (2003) (the equitable principle that slayers should not profit from their own
wrongful acts).
76. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 41
(1921); see also Anthony D'Amato, Elmer's Rule: A Jurisprudential Dialogue, 60 IOWA
L. REV. 1129, 1129 (1975) (observing that Justice Cardozo wrote of the Riggs case that
"two analytical paths pointed in different directions and the judges selected the path
that seemed better to lead to 'justice' ").
77. Wade, supra note 10, at 716.
78. Eversole v. Eversole, 185 S.W. 487, 489 (Ky. 1916) ("If a change in that policy
is desired, application must be made to the Legislature, and not to the judiciary, whose
function it is to declare the law, but not to make it."); see also McGovern, Jr., supra
note 9, at 106 (noting that "[m]ost courts in this country have assumed that any rules on
the subject must come from the legislature"); Reppy, supra note 21, at 263-64; Wade,
supra note to, at 716.
79. Wade, supra note to, at 718. Wade takes the view that a statutory approach
has fewer vulnerabilities because "in view of the fact that [equitable judicial engrafting]
... is so unprecedented and extraordinary, a statute which would relieve the situation
and reach the same result by a more customary and authoritative method is to be de
sired." Id.
80. Id. at 720 (concluding "that in the vast majority of the states a statute ade
quately covering the problem is needed").
81. Reppy, supra note 21, at 263-64 ("The earliest case to suggest a statutory solu
tion of the problem was Owens v. Owens in 1888, and this suggestion resulted in the
enactment of a statute by the North Carolina Legislature the following year." (footnote
omitted) (citing Owens v. Owens, 6 S.E. 794 (N.C. 1888))).
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passing statutes that sought to solve the slayer problem once and
for al1. 82 Within a short time after the Riggs decision, the slayer
problem had been addressed by statute in nearly half of all state
jurisdictions.83
Once states began to pass statutes en masse, two potential
flaws in these statutes were revealed. First, the failure of state legis
latures to be comprehensive in their drafting resulted in statutes
that were underinc1usive and allowed slayers to continue to profit in
certain rarified situations. 84 Second, and at the other end of the
spectrum, were states that passed overinc1usive statutes that
divested slayers of property beyond what they stood to gain from
their unlawful act. 8S
A.

The Problem of Underinclusiveness: Legislative Failure to
Draft Comprehensive Statutes Resulting in Inapplicability
to Particular Property Interests

Poor drafting sometimes resulted in statutes that were underin
c1usive. 86 It has been observed that much of the early legislation
aimed at addressing the slayer problem was not entirely successful
because it was not sufficiently comprehensive to provide for all of
the possible factual permutations surrounding murderers and their
victims.87 Many statutes only barred slayers succeeding to property
by means of will or intestacy.88 In doing so, they failed to provide
for the property inheritable by slayers by other means such as
dower,89 elective share,90 and the right of survivorship.91 This lack
82. Wade, supra note 10, at 716 ("[I]n most of the jurisdictions in which the courts
refused to engraft an exception a statute rectifying the omission was passed shortly
thereafter. ").
83. [d. at 721 (noting that "23 states and the District of Columbia" had, by the
mid-1930s, "passed acts which cover the [slayer] subject with varying degrees of
completeness").
84. See infra Part III.A
85. See infra Part III.B.
86. See Reppy, supra note 21, at 264.
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-513 (2005).
89. See, e.g., Eversole v. Eversole, 185 S.W. 487, 489 (Ky. 1916) (slayer allowed to
claim dower rights).
90. See, e.g., Long v. Kuhn (In re Kuhn's Estate), 101 N.W. 151, 153 (Iowa 1904)
(slayer allowed to claim elective share).
91. See, e.g., Woodson v. Foster (In re Estate of Foster), 320 P.2d 855, 860 (Kan.
1958) (construing the predecessor to section 59-513 of the Kansas Statutes and holding
that the language "or otherwise" that followed specific language preventing the taking
as an heir or by will was insufficient to extend such a bar to cover joint tenants with a
right of survivorship).
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of comprehensiveness, coupled with the expressio unius canon of
statutory construction,92 resulted in courts refusing to extend bars
to succession to property in which a slayer might equitably be pre
vented from taking. 93 While these early missteps did nothing to
lessen the recognition that statutory development in this area was
desirable,94 they did make clear that a carefully drafted, compre
hensive statute would be necessary to avoid the piecemeal applica
tion of prior attempts at a common law solution. 95
B.

The Problem of Overinclusiveness and the "Owned Interest
Rationale" as a Means of Addressing such Concerns

A second, potentially more problematic flaw that became ap
parent in early slayer statutes involved their constitutionality.96
The most immediate objection to slayer statutes was that they vio
lated the prohibitions against corruption of blood and forfeiture of
estate contained in the federal and most state constitutions. 97 Such
concerns were first articulated in those early decisions that refused
to apply the slayer rule at common law. 98 Courts kept a wide berth
from this possibility in applying the common law. Yet when con
struing new statutes preventing acquisition of property by slayers,
92. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius is the Latin phrase meaning "the ex
press[ion of] one item of a[n] ... associated group or series excludes another left un
mentioned." United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55,65 (2002).
93. This pattern of effective underinclusiveness can be seen in a number of juris
dictions. See, e.g., Wenker v. Landon, 88 P.2d 971, 975 (Or. 1939), overruled in part by
Hargrove v. Taylor, 389 P.2d 36, 37 (Or. 1964) (construing as insufficient for extension
the language "or receive any interest ... as surviving spouse"); Beddingfield v. Estill,
100 S.W. 108, 111 (Tenn. 1907) (same result construing the language "take . . .
otherwise").
94. Wade, supra note 10, at 716.
95. See, e.g., N.Y. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591, 600 (1886) (life
insurance); Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 191 (N.Y. 1889) (wills); Owens v. Owens, 6
S.E. 794, 795 (N.C. 1888) (dower); Beddingfield, 100 S.W. at 111 (right of survivorship).
96. Wade, supra note 10, at 720 (Observing that once the desirability of a statu
tory approach is conceded the pertinent question becomes: "would such a statute be
constitutional?").
97. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 ("[N]o Attainder ... shall work Corrup
tion of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted.").
98. 5 TIFFANY, supra note 42, § 1378; see also Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 106 N.E. 785,
790 (Ill. 1914) (refusing to bar a slayer from inheriting because the Constitution con
tains "clear and unequivocal declarations of the public policy of this state to the effect
that no forfeiture of property rights shall follow conviction for crime" (quoting Collins
v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 83 N.E. 542, 543 (Ill. 1907»); McAllister v. Fair, 84 P. 112, 113
(Kan. 1906) ("[It is not] easy to attribute to the Legislature an intention to take from a
criminal the right to inherit as a consequence of his crime, since the Constitution pro
vides that no conviction shall work a corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate.").
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they more frequently endorsed the view of the Riggs majority that
denial of succession is not a forfeiture because it "takes from [a
slayer] no property," but merely prevents her from acquiring prop
erty by her crime. 99 This is evidenced by the fact that direct consti
tutional attacks on slayer statutes in the early statutory period were
exceedingly rare,lOO and more often than not, the constitutionality
of statutes was impliedly assumed. lOI
The idea that constitutional prohibitions against forfeiture are
not triggered in cases where a slayer had only an expectancy inter
est has been referred to as the "owned interest" rationale.102 This
has been, and remains, the "most popular rationale" to shield slayer
statutes from constitutional attack. 103 While the owned interest ra
tionale has been criticized as perhaps too formalistic to form the
basis for constitutional distinctions,104 its basic tenet-that a mere
expectancy interest cannot form the basis for a claim of forfeiture
has become generally accepted in the analysis of slayer statutes.
That tenet can be expressed in the following syllogism: a slayer can
not be considered to have forfeited that which she does not own;
one who stands to inherit by will or intestacy does not own, prior to
probate, what she expects to inherit; therefore, a statute that merely
bans a slayer from acquiring property through the probate code
cannot be considered a forfeiture.10 5
In addition to claims of unconstitutional forfeiture, the owned
interest rationale shields slayer statutes from other constitutional
99. Perry v. Strawbridge, 108 S.W. 641, 648 (Mo. 1908) ("There is no forfeiture of
an estate" when a slayer has simply been barred "from acquiring property in an unau
thorized and unlawful way, i.e., by murder."); Riggs, 22 N.E. at 190.
100. Wade, supra note 10, at 721. Wade notes that by the mid-1930s, only one
case had directly attacked the constitutionality of a slayer statute, and even then, "it was
easily upheld." Id; see also Hamblin v. Marchant, 175 P. 678 (Kan. 1918), affd, 180 P.
811 (Kan. 1919).
101. See Wilson v. Bates, 231 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Ky. 1950).
102. Mary Louise Fellows, The Slayer Rule: Not Solely a Matter of Equity, 71
IOWA L. REV. 489, 540 (1986) (explaining that according to the "owned interest" ratio
nale, constitutional protections against "forfeiture of estate and corruption of blood
apply only to property the felon owned and not to property in which the felon had only
an expectancy interest").
103. Id. ("The owned interest rationale is the most popular rationale for uphold
ing the slayer rule. ").
104. Id. at 541-42 (noting the inevitability that under such a rationale "function
ally similar property interests would be subject to different rules based solely on formal
istic labels").
105. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION: QUASI CONTRACTS & CON
STRUCTIVE TRUSTS § 187 cmt. c (1937) ("Under the rules stated in this Section, the
murderer is not deprived of property lawfully acquired by him, but is merely prevented
from acquiring the beneficial interest in property through his unlawful act").
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attacks so long as a statute does not seek to deprive a slayer of a
right in which she has a vested interest.1 06 For example, if it is ac
cepted that a slayer is not actually being deprived of property at all,
due process protections are not violated. 107 Likewise, a statute that
deprives a defendant of no vested property interest will likely not
be considered punitive and thus will not form the basis of a double
jeopardy claim.lOs The conclusion to be drawn, therefore, is that a
statute that solely prevents a slayer from acquiring property from
her victim and does not take any property from her is constitu
tional.1 09 By the same token, a statute depriving a slayer of a vested
property interest will be unconstitutional. Such a deprivation may
be both an impermissible forfeiture and a violation of other consti
tutional protections, such as the prohibitions against double jeop
ardy.110 Accordingly, just as a poorly drafted statute may be
underinclusive for its failure "to bring all the possible cases within
[its] purview,"111 it may also be overinclusive, potentially in viola
tion of state and federal constitutional provisions, by denying a
slayer property in which she held a cognizable interest prior to the
slaying.
C.

Application of the Owned Interest Rationale to More
Substantial Property Interests

Given these stakes, legal commentators and academics recog
nized early that a well-drafted slayer statute must carefully consider
106. Fellows, supra note 102, at 721.
107. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ...."); see also MASS. CONST. pt. 1,
art. XII ("[N]o subject shall be arrested, imprisoned, despoiled, or deprived of his prop
erty, immunities, or privileges, put out of the protection of the law, exiled, or deprived
of his life, liberty, or estate, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land."
(emphasis added)); Wade, supra note 10, at 721 ("[U]nless property is taken away from
the slayer as a result of his crime, it seems impossible to say that the due process of law
clause is violated." (emphasis added)).
108. Such a forfeiture would be considered civil rather than criminal and not sub
ject to the protections of the double jeopardy clause. See generally 1. Andrew Vines,
Case Note, United States v. Ursery: The Supreme Court Refuses to Extend Double Jeop
ardy Protection to Civil in rem Forfeiture, 50 ARK. L. REV. 797, 805-10 (1998).
109. Wade, supra note 10, at 721; see also Hamblin v. Marchant, 175 P. 678, 679
(Kan. 1918) (holding that a slayer statute barring a wife from taking her victim-hus
band's estate does not violate bans of forfeiture or the Fourteenth Amendment because
she "never acquired nor received anything that could be taken from her").
110. Perry v. Strawbridge, 108 S.W. 641, 648 (Mo. 1908). The court illuminated
this dichotomy by stating: "The state cannot by law take a criminal's property, but it can
say to every individual citizen, 'you cannot acquire property by designated unlawful
means.''' Id.
111. Reppy, supra note 21, at 264.
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the myriad property interests that may come into play.H2 There is
little argument that the right to take by inheritance through a will
(or intestacy in the absence thereof) is, before the passing of the
decedent, merely an expectancy and not a vested ownership
right,l13 In cases involving such clear expectancy interests, legisla
tures have largely employed the fiction that, for the purposes of
descent and distribution, the killer is deemed to have predeceased
the decedent,1I4 Under the owned interest rationale, there is no
real difficulty as to the constitutionality of statutes affecting those
interests. However, there exist other interests that "are signifi
cantly more substantial than the right to take by intestacy [or] will"
which may fall under a slayer statute. 1I5 Differences inherent to
these more substantial property interests must be accounted for in
drafting a statute lest it become unconstitutionally overinclusive.H 6
Examples of a property rights more substantial than the right
to inherit by will include the accretive property interests realized
through joint tenancy1I7 and tenancy by the entirety.u8 These in
112. See generally UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803 (amended 1997), 8 U.L.A. 58-59
(Supp. 2008); Wade, supra note 10.
113. TIFFANY, supra note 34, § 172.
114. 16 Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property § 90.12[3][A], AT 90-154 TO 
154.1 (MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF ED., LEXISNEXIS 2008) (1949) ("For the purposes of the
law of intestacy, the effect of a killing is usually to treat the killer as having predeceased
the victim. ").
115. Fellows, supra note 102, at 542.
116. See Wade, supra note 10, at 725-26.
117. Joint tenancy is a form of concurrent ownership developed at common law
and codified by statute in most states by which all joint tenants are considered to be a
single owner of the property. TIFFANY, supra note 34, § 187. Four elements, or "uni
ties," are essential for the formation of a joint tenancy: (1) the joint tenants' interest
must be acquired or vest at the same time; (2) title must be granted to all in the same
written instrument; (3) each joint tenant must have equal undivided shares of the prop
erty; and (4) each must have right to possession of the whole. Id. If these elements are
satisfied, each joint tenant is, through employment of the legal fiction that all joint
owners are but one owner, considered seized of the entire property. See id.
A necessary incident of this fiction and the outstanding characteristic of a joint
tenancy is the right of survivorship. Id. The practical consequence of this right is that,
assuming there are only two joint tenants, when one joint tenant dies, the surviving
tenant owns the entire estate. Id. Since the joint tenants are fictitiously considered by
the law to be one, nothing actually passes to the remaining joint tenant. Id. The re
maining joint tenant simply owns individually what he already owned jointly, the de
ceased joint tenant's interest being extinguished by death. Id. A joint tenancy can be
converted unilaterally, thus destroying the right of survivorship at the option of either
tenant in his lifetime by a severance of the tenancy. See, e.g., Riddle v. Harmon, 102
Cal. App. 3d 524 (1980). A severance may be brought about by destroying anyone of
the four "unities." TIFFANY, supra note 34, § 189. For example, a conveyance of inter
est by one joint tenant destroys the unity of title thus severing the tenancy and defeat
ing the right of survivorship. Id.
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terests have caused the most difficulty and engendered the most
controversy when included without appropriate care in slayer stat
utes.n 9 To understand how these differ from mere expectancy in
terests it is necessary to understand that a slayer's interest in
property held jointly includes a right of survivorship that is vested
at the time of the conveyance. Through the employment of the le
gal fiction that all joint owners are but one owner, a slayer is consid
ered seized of the entire property from the very beginning. 120
When one joint tenant dies the surviving tenant owns the entire
estate by operation of her right of survivorship.121 Therefore, a
slayer has a substantially greater interest in property held jointly
with a right of survivorship, whether as a joint tenant or as a tenant
by the entirety, than she has in the nonvested expectancy interest
that she stands to inherit by will or intestacy. Accordingly, it has
been recognized that much care in drafting is required to properly
address what exactly the statute seeks to deny a slayer.122

118. A tenancy by the entirety is, in most ways, the same as a joint tenancy with
the further requirement that the tenants be married. TIFFANY, supra note 34, § 195.
But see Peter Hay, Recognition of Same-Sex Legal Relationships in the United States, 54
AM. J. COMPo L. SUPP. 257, 268 (2006) (noting that in at least one recent case, the
benefits of tenancy by the entirety have been granted to nonmarried domestic part
ners). As with joint tenancies, the outstanding characteristic of a tenancy by the en
tirety is the right of survivorship. TIFFANY, supra note 34, § 195. However, unlike a
joint tenancy, survivorship rights cannot be defeated unilaterally by either tenant. Id.
Tenancies by the entirety are recognized in Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Del
aware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
Vermont, Virginia, the Virgin Islands, and Wyoming. Alan M. Ahart, The Liability of
Property Exempted in Bankruptcy for Pre-Petition Domestic Support Obligations After
BAPCPA: Debtors Beware, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 233, 239-41 (2007).
119. Other property interests, such as dower, curtesy, and revocable transfers,
have caused controversy to a lesser degree, but those are beyond the scope of this Note.
See generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION: QUASI CONTRACTS & CON
STRUCTIVE TRUSTS § 188 (1937); 4 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION
§ 20.11 (1978).
120. TIFFANY, supra note 34, § 187.
121. Wade, supra note 10, at 728 ("The problem here is different ... since the
slayer already has a property interest, of which he cannot constitutionally be deprived
by the statute.").
122. Id. at 721.
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D. Statutory Approaches Addressing loint Property Interests of
Slayers in Slayer Statutes
Early statutes, due to their underinc1usive nature,123 rarely
mentioned these vested joint interests at al1. 124 Courts construing
these silent statutes often held that they prevented the slayer from
taking as devisee or legatee only, leaving intact the interests attend
ant to nonprobate transfers such as joint tenancy and tenancy by
the entirety.125 The courts reasoned that a murderous joint tenant
or tenant by the entirety could not, and shall not, be divested by
operation of a probate statute. 126 However, cognizant of both the
equitable dilemma raised by allowing a killer to acquire the entire
estate and the serious constitutional issues raised by divesting him
of his vested interest, courts began to articulate methods that might
avoid both of these problems by limiting a slayer to some amount of
the jointly held property, but less than the entire estate. 127 Two
dominant approaches have emerged from these articulations. 128
Under the first approach, an unlawful act causes a severance of the
tenancy,129 thus allowing the slayer to retain only a one-half
share-not to acquire the remainder of the jointly owned interest as
he normally would. Under the second, the unlawful act causes
some portion of the jointly held property to be held in a construc
tive trust for the heirs of the deceased, often limiting the slayer's
retention to a one-half interest for life.130 The ultimate goal under
123. See supra Part III.A.
124. Reppy, supra note 21, at 263-64 (stating that in 1888, North Carolina was the
first state to address the issue statutorily).
125. See Ashwood v. Patterson, 49 So. 2d 848, 850 (Fla. 1951) (en banc) (noting
the lack of any cognizable transfer of interest in the working of survivorship); Bradley v.
Fox, 129 N.E.2d 699, 706 (Ill. 1955) (noting that a murderous husband did not actually
take at the death of his wife); Vesey v. Vesey, 54 N.W.2d 385, 388 (Minn. 1952); supra
Part III.e.
126. Woodson v. Foster (In re Estate of Foster), 320 P.2d 855, 860 (Kan. 1958)
(joint tenants); Vesey, 54 N.W.2d at 385 (joint owner of a joint and several bank
account).
127. See, e.g., Colton v. Wade, 80 A.2d 923, 925 (Del. Ch. 1951). The court con
ceded that under the doctrine of tenancy by the entirety, the slayer's interest is vested
and he strictly gains no new interest by the death of his spouse. Id. Nonetheless, the
court subjected the property to a constructive trust for the benefit of the decedent's
heirs in order to overcome the inequitable means utilized in an attempt to gain sole
possession. Id.
128. Fellows, supra note 102, at 515. This dichotomy is based on "the assumption
that the slayer and the victim were the only joint tenants." Id.
129. See VNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803 (amended 1997), 8 V.L.A. 58-59 (Supp.
2008).
130. See generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF REsTITUTION: QUASI CONTRACTS &
CONSTRUcnvE TRUSTS § 188 (1937).
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both of these approaches is to prevent the slayer from benefiting in
any way from his act.131
1.

The Severance Approach

A judicial or statutory severance of the joint interest is the
most common solution to the slayer problem.1 32 Various rationales
support this result. For instance, in cases of tenancy by the entirety,
courts have observed that a felonious killing is analogous to a di
vorce or marriage dissolution in that a murderous spouse willfully
dissolves the marital relationship, thereby destroying the essential
element of marriage. This act severs the tenancy and the slayer
loses his right of survivorship.133 In the case of joint tenancies,
courts have found the justification for severance by parsing out the
relevant interests held by a surviving joint tenant. 134 In so doing,
courts have observed that, notwithstanding the fiction that the right
of survivorship delivers nothing to the survivor,135 an additional in
terest is in fact realized in the succession from joint to sole owner
ship.136 To the extent that such a gain is cognizable, statutes and
the equitable powers of the court can prevent a slayer from so prof
iting from his wrong. 137
In addition to logically parsing the various interests held by a
joint tenant, severance credits a slayer's preslaying right to sever
and partition the property, taking half in fee, independent of survi
vorship.Bs The authors of the Uniform Probate Code,139 commen
131. Fellows, supra note 102, at 515.
132. Of the forty-five states that currently have some form of slayer statute on the
books, thirty of them require a severance of the tenancy in cases involving a murder by
the cotenant in a tenancy by the entirety or joint tenancy. Wade, supra note 10, at 715.
133. Ashwood v. Patterson, 49 So. 2d 848, 850 (Fla. 1951); Budwit v. Herr, 63
N.W.2d 841, 848 (Mich. 1954).
134. In re Estate of Kirk, 591 N.W.2d 630, 634-35 (Iowa 1999).
The proportional interest is the joint tenant's interest which comes from the
creation of the joint tenancy which necessarily occurs before the death of an
other joint tenant. The accretive interest, on the other hand, is the interest the
survivor receives at the death of a joint tenant. Thus, where two joint tenants
have an interest in property and one joint tenant dies, the surviving joint ten
ant has a one-half proportional interest and a one-half accretive interest.
/d. (citations omitted).
135. Grose v. Holland, 211 S.W.2d 464, 465-67 (Mo. 1948).
136. Id.
137. See id.
138. Fellows, supra note 102, at 515. In the case of a joint tenancy, severance may
be accomplished unilaterally. See Riddle v. Harmon, 162 Cal. Rptr. 530, 534 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1980). Tenants by the entirety do not have this unilateral right. TIFFANY, supra
note 34, § 195. The salience of this difference, in terms of its determining the rights of
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tators,140 case law,141 and the slayer statutes
states 142 support the severance approach.
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a majority of

The Constructive Trust Approach

An alternative measure used to prevent a slayer from taking
the entire estate is the imposition of a constructive trust upon all or
some portion of the joint property.1 43 Although utilized in only a
cotenants, has largely been overlooked by commentators, legislatures, and courts, who
have treated both according to a single rule. Fellows, supra note 102, at 517. Propo
nents of severance have glossed over these differences by analogizing to the right to
sever a tenancy by the entirety through divorce. See, e.g., Preston v. Chabot, 412 A.2d
930, 933 (Vt. 1980). Proponents of imposition of- a constructive trust have reasoned
similarly. See Nat'l City Bank of Evansville v. Bledsoe, 144 N.E.2d 710, 714 (Ind. 1957);
Estate of Foleno ex rei. Thomas v. Estate of Foleno, 772 N.E.2d 490, 496 (Ind. Ct. App.
2002); Sundin v. Klein, 269 S.E.2d 787, 792 (Va. 1980). Some commentators have
balked at this outcome however. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS &
OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.4 cmt. I (2003) ("[A] decree giving homicide the
effect of severance is presumptively inappropriate.").
139. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803(c)(2) (amended 1997), 8 U.L.A. 58 (Supp.
2008) (stating that a slaying "severs the interests of the killer and decedent in property
held by them at the time of the killing as joint tenants with right of survivorship"); see
also UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-201(26) (amended 1990), 8 U.L.A. 13 (Supp. 2008) (de
fining "Joint tenants with right of survivorship" to include tenants by the entirety).
140. See, e.g., Wade, supra note 10, at 732.
141. See, e.g., Johansen v. Pelton, 87 Cal. Rptr. 784, 791-92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970);
Bradley v. Fox, 129 N.E.2d 699, 705-06 (Ill. 1955); Maine Sav. Bank v. Bridges, 431 A.2d
633, 636 (Me. 1981); Williford v. Cantwell (In re Estate of Cox), 380 P.2d 584, 587
(Mont. 1963); Duncan v. Vassaur, 550 P.2d 929, 931 (Okla. 1976); Gelden v. Safran (In
re Estate of Safran), 306 N.W.2d 27, 38 (Wis. 1981).
142. The Uniform Probate Code approach, and thus severance, has been hugely
influential on legislatures and has been adopted in nineteen states. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.4 reporter's note 1
(2003) (naming nineteen states that have based their slayer statute on the Uniform
Probate Code); see also ALA. CODE. § 43-8-jl53 (LexisNexis 1991); ALASKA STAT.
§ 13.12.803 (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2803 (2005); CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 250
54 (West 2002 & Supp. 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-803 (West 2005); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 732.802 (West 2005); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:2-803 (LexisNexis
2005); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-803 (1998); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN.
§ 700.2803(2)(b) (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-803 (West 2002); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 72-2-813(3)(b) (2007); NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2354 (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 3B:7-1.1(West 2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-803 (West 2003); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 62-2-803 (1987 & Supp. 2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-803 (2004); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 75-2-803(3)(b) (Supp. 2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 854.14 (West 2002 & Supp.
2007).
143. See generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION: QUASI CONTRACfS &
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS § 188 (1937) ("Where two persons have an interest in property
and the interest of one of them is enlarged by his murder of the other, to the extent to
which it is enlarged he holds it upon a constructive trust for the estate of the other.").
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minority of state slayer statutes,l44 this approach is recommended
by the Restatement of Restitution,145 and finds support in commen
taryl46 as well as case law. 147 As is the case with severance, propo
nents of the constructive trust theory base their analysis "upon the
principle that although the murderer will not be deprived of prop
erty to which he would otherwise be entitled, he will not be entitled
to profit by the murder."148 Like the severance rationale, the con
structive trust doctrine recognizes the ability of the courts or legisla
tures to parse out the interests held by the slayer and prevent her
from taking any property, right, or interest not clearly vested in the
slayer before her felonious act. 149 The constructive trust doctrine
also precludes the possibility that the slayer will ultimately survive
the deceased. 150 Imposition of a constructive trust resolves the
doubt as to order of deaths against the slayer by assuming that she
would have naturally predeceased her victim. 151 Based on such an
assumption, it has been observed that all a killer was ever really
guaranteed is the use value of the net income of one half of the
property for her life; all else is merely an expectancy interest. 152 In
effect, the imposition of a constructive trust treats the joint tenancy
as if it remains intact-as if the victim were not dead-and allows
144. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-6 (2007); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 112.475, .485
(2007).
145. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION: QUASI CONTRACfS & CONSTRUC
TIVE TRUSTS § 188.
146. Most notable of these commentators is John Wade. See Fellows, supra note
102, at 515-16, n.77. Those states that utilize a constructive trust in the case of joint
interests essentially adopt Professor Wade's joint tenancy model provision verbatim.
Id.; see also Wade, supra note 10, at 725-26.
147. See Colton v. Wade, 80 A.2d 923, 925 (De\. Ch. 1951) ("My conclusion that a
trust should be impressed gives powerful recognition to the deeply imbedded equitable
principle that a person shall not be permitted to profit by his own wrong.").
148. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION: QUASI CONTRACfS & CONSTRUC
TIVE TRUSTS § 188 cmt. a; see also Estate of Foleno ex rel. Thomas v. Estate of Foleno,
772 N.E.2d 490, 496 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
149. See Colton, 80 A.2d at 925; Nat'l City Bank of Evansville v. Bledsoe, 144
N.E.2d 710, 714 (Ind. 1957).
150. 5 AUSTIN WAKEMAN Scon & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS § 493.2 (4th ed. 1989).
151. Id. § 493.2(3) ("[I]t would seem legitimate in any event to resolve doubts as
to who would have been the survivor but for the murder in favor of the victim and
against the murderer."); see also Colton, 80 A.2d at 926.
152. See Colton, 80 A.2d at 925; Bledsoe, 144 N.E.2d at 715. It is important to
note that application of a trust to the entire estate is the most restrictive version of the
rationale. Some proponents of the constructive trust have limited its application to the
undivided one-half interest in the tenancy, thus, in effect, utilizing severance in addition
to the trust to resolve the issue. See Estate of Foleno, 772 N.E.2d at 496; Barnett v.
Couey, 27 S.W.2d 757, 760 (Mo. Ct. App. 1930).
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the victim's estate to succeed to either half or the entire property
upon the slayer's death.1 53
Both of these approaches allow a statute to be as comprehen
sive as equitable principles demand while simultaneously avoiding
unconstitutional overinclusiveness cautioned by the "owned inter
est" rationale. While it is arguable that severance or the application
of a constructive trust may stretch the owned interest rationale to
its limit,154 these approaches have nonetheless managed to maintain
a balance between the competing demands of law and equity. The
approach taken by Massachusetts differs in ways that threaten to
topple this carefully struck balance.
IV.

THE MASSACHUSETTS STATUTE

To properly assess the overall comparability and placement of
the Massachusetts statute within the larger understanding of the
slayer problem that developed in the century prior to its passage, it
is necessary to pause for a moment and analyze, in depth, the stat
ute, its effect, and the legislative considerations from which it
sprang. Such an analysis reveals a difference in approach and ap
parent intent that directly impact the constitutionality of the statute
as written.1 55
A.

The Statute Requires a Forfeiture to be Exacted Against
Surviving Joint Tenants and Tenants by the Entirety

Massachusetts General Law chapter 265, section 46 is among
the most recently passed state slayer statutes currently in effect. 156
153. Fellows, supra note 102, at 517. Professor Fellows criticizes this approach as
follows:
A straightforward application of the fiction that the victim survived the slayer
is appealing, but a state should not adopt the [constructive trust] view because
it compels the state to adopt the further fiction that the slayer died without
exercising the right to sever. [This] view fails to recognize that the slayer's
right to sever makes the victim's right to take as survivor no longer relevant
when applying the slayer rule.
Id.
154. /d. at 542 (noting that in some cases the courts have been forced to strain
"their analysis to find an expectancy interest and uphold the slayer rule").
155. See infra Parts V.A-B.
156. Jeffrey G. Sherman, Mercy Killing and the Right to Inherit, 61 U. eIN. L.
REV. 803, 805 (1993) (noting that at the time of writing, 1993, Massachusetts and New
Hampshire were the only two states not applying either a common law or statutory
slayer rule). Since that time, Massachusetts passed Massachusetts General Law chapter
265, section 46 in 2003, and New Hampshire adopted a common law rule requiring the
imposition of a constructive trust in the cases involving the slayer rule and joint prop
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In it, the Massachusetts legislature has taken an approach in regard
to joint tenancies and tenancies by the entirety that differs elemen
tally from approaches taken by other states, courts, and commenta
tors. 157 Rather than severing the interests in the property or
imposing an equitable trust, the Massachusetts statute explicitly re
quires that property held jointly or by the entirety be distributed as
if the slayer had predeceased the decedent. 158 The consequence of
this approach is that, by operation of law, all property interests, in
cluding vested interests, held by a surviving joint tenant are for
feited by operation of the statute. 159
erty interests. See An Act Relative to the Descent and Distribution of Property, 2002
Mass. Acts 1195 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 46 (2006»; Hopwood v. Pick
ett, 761 A.2d 436, 438 (N.H. 2000); Kelley v. State, 196 A.2d 68, 69-70 (N.H. 1963).
157. Forfeiture of a vested interest by operation of the slayer rule or a slayer
statute is not without precedent. See, e.g., Lore v. Habermeyer (In re King's Estate), 52
N.W.2d 885, 889 (Wis. 1952) (granting the whole of the joint property to the victim's
estate), modification recognized by Hackl v. Hackl (In re Estate of Hackl), 604 N.W.2d
579, 582-83 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999). Modern thinking on the issue nearly unanimously
rejects the result reached in Lore. See McGovern, Jr., supra note 9, at 86 (stating in
1969 that all jurisdictions allow the slayer to keep his interest because his "interest is
not acquired from his crime"). But see Lakatos v. Estate of Billotti, 509 S.E.2d 594,
597-98 CW. Va. 1998) (construing the words "or otherwise" in the West Virginia slayer
statute to include the right of survivorship and holding that the "statutory language
clearly provides that upon the death of the victim, the total estate in a joint tenancy
passes in its entirety" as "if the slayer had predeceased the victim").
158. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 46. The statute reads in part:
The court shall prohibit any person charged with the unlawful killing of
the decedent from taking from the decedent's estate through its distribution
and disposition, including property held between the person charged and the
decedent in joint tenancy or by tenancy in the entirety. The court shall con
sider any person convicted of the unlawful killing of the decedent as predeceas
ing the decedent for the purpose of distribution and disposition of the decedent's
estate including property held between the person charged and the decedent in
joint tenancy or by tenancy in the entirety. The bar to succession shall apply

only to murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree or manslaugh
ter; it shall not include vehicular homicide or negligent manslaughter in the
death of the decedent. No court shall distribute the accused's share of the
decedent's assets until a verdict or finding on the charge has been rendered in
open court.
[d. (emphasis added).
The use of the fiction that the slayer has predeceased the decedent for the purposes
of descent and distribution is common among slayer statutes. See Wade, supra note 10,
at 724-25. Professor Wade, in his highly influential model slayer statute, recommended
the application of this fiction as early as 1936. See id. It is the application of this fiction
to interests with the right of survivorship that is without precedent. See id. at 728 (not
ing that application of this fiction to tenancies by the entirety would not be acceptable
"since the slayer already has a property interest, of which he cannot constitutionally be
deprived by [a] ... statute").
159. This is because of the operation of joint tenancies generally. Massachusetts,
like all states that allow joint tenancies and tenancies by the entirety, recognizes that
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This departure from previously accepted means of dealing with
the slayer problem is remarkable in a number of ways.160 First, it
deemphasizes the primacy of the maxim that a person should not be
allowed to profit from his own wrong by exceeding the scope of this
goal and producing the type of punitive forfeiture that has been
warned against since the enactment of the earliest model slayer
statutes. 161 Notwithstanding variances in approach, there had been
a previous consensus that equity is not best served by depriving kill
ers of their own property but by preventing them from wrongfully
acquiring the property of their victims. 162 In abandoning this diswhen one joint tenant dies, the surviving tenant takes the entire estate automatically
because the two tenants are considered one. See Bernatavicius v. Bernatavicius, 156
N.E. 685, 686 (Mass. 1927); see also TIFFANY, supra note 34, § 188. Therefore, pursuant
to two legal fictions, first that joint tenants and tenants by the entirety are one entity
and second that a convicted cotenant has predeceased the deceased, the now "de
ceased" murderer loses all vested interest in the property.
160. On its face, the statute operates on two discrete levels. First, it requires that
the court prohibit a person charged with killing the victim "from taking from the dece
dent's estate through its distribution and disposition, including property held between
the person charged and the decedent" jointly or by the entirety. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
265, § 46. At this point, the statute does not require that the court distribute the prop
erty in accordance with the predeceased fiction or otherwise. See id. Instead, the stat
ute merely mandates that the accused be prevented from taking. Id.
The use of the phrase "taking from the decedent's estate" has some latent ambigui
ties in and of itself. It has been argued, and argued successfully, that one tenant by the
entirety does not "take" anything upon the death of the other. See Beddingfield v.
Estill, 100 S.W. 108, 110 (Tenn. 1907) (holding that a husband "could not and did not
inherit, acquire, or otherwise take any interest or estate in the lands from or through his
wife" upon her death because title to the entire estate "was acquired and vested in him
by the conveyances made to him and his wife previous to her death"); see also Woodson
v. Foster (In re Estate of Foster), 320 P.2d 855, 858 (Kan. 1958).
In the case of the Massachusetts statute, however, this potential ambiguity seems to
be resolved with the immediate inclusion of these estates. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
265, § 46. In effect, this provision merely freezes those assets in question until resolu
tion of the charges against the defendant. See id. This interpretation seems to be sup
ported by the inclusion of the language "[n]o court shall distribute the accused's share
of the decedent's assets until a verdict or finding on the charge has been rendered in
open court," which appears later in the statute. Id.
Second, the statute requires that upon conviction of the accused, the court dis
tribute those relevant assets as if the killer had "predeceas[ed] the decedent for the
purpose of distribution and disposition." Id. Once again, the statute clearly applies this
fiction to joint tenancies and tenancies by the entirety. Id. If the person charged is
found not guilty, the statute states that "the accused may take." Id.
161. While the equitable postulate that one must be prevented from profiting
from one's own wrong was referenced during legislative debates, the statute goes far
beyond this goal. Wade, supra note 10, at 728.
162. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 8.4 cmt. 1 (2003) (adopting the view of the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION:
QUASI CONTRACfS & CONSTRUCfIVE TRUSTS § 188 (1937) that a slayer who is a tenant
by the entirety or a joint tenant with a right of survivorship "retains only the right to
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tinction, the Massachusetts statute loses the protection of the
owned interest rationale resulting in a unique vulnerability to con
stitutional challenges based on forfeiture.1 63
Moreover, in addition to deemphasizing an equitable or reme
dial intent, the Massachusetts statute produces an undeniably puni
tive effect.1 64 Many other legislatures have been emphatic, often on
the face of their slayer statutes, that those statutes function as equi
table rather than punitive measures. 165 While a purely remedial
legislative action does not trigger a full panoply of constitutional
protections, a statute that is punitive both in effect and intent impli
cates state and federal constitutional protections-most notably
those guaranteeing due process of law and prohibiting ex post facto
laws and double jeopardy.166 On its face, the Massachusetts statute
half of the income from the property for life" while simultaneously maintaining that a
slayer's own property is not forfeited). Compare id., with UNIF. !'ROBATE CODE § 2
803 (amended 1997), 8 U.L.A. 58-59 (Supp. 2008) (adopting the alternate view that a
slayer who is a tenant by the entirety or a joint tenant with a right of survivorship
retains an undivided one-half interest in fee, yet also interpreted as prohibiting forfei
ture of a vested interest). An example can be seen in Howard v. Mejia, where the court
determined that the applicable statute did not intend to divest a person of his vested
property rights. Howard v. Mejia (In re Estate of Alarcon), 718 P.2d 993 (Ariz. App.
1984).
163. The owned interest rationale limits cognizable forfeitures to property inter
ests that are vested rather than mere expectancy interests. See supra Part I1I.B; see also
Nat'l City Bank of Evansville v. Bledsoe, 144 N.E.2d 710, 716 (Ind. 1957).
164. The fact that the statute so explicitly requires the application of the "prede
ceased the decedent fiction" to joint interests leaves little room for a nonpunitive, con
stitutionally sound construction of the statute as drafted. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER,
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCfION § 47:23 (6th ed. 2000) ("A statute which
provides that a thing shall be done in a certain way carries with it an implied prohibition
against doing that thing in any other way.").
165. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 8.4 cmt. a (2003) ("The slayer rule is not punitive, that being the function of the crimi
nallaw."); see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 2322(k) (1995) ("This section shall not be
considered penal in nature, but shall be constructed broadly in order to effect the policy
of this state that a person shall not be permitted to profit by that person's own wrong.");
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-803(n) (2001) ("This section shall not be considered penal in
nature, but shall be construed broadly in order to effect the policy of this state that no
person shall be allowed to profit by his own wrong, wherever committed."). Such a
concern has also been echoed by courts construing statutes. See, e.g., Armstrong v.
Bray, 826 P.2d 706, 709 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (interpreting the statute as preventing
killers "from profiting from their wrongful act[s]"). The court emphasized that
"[s]tatutes were not enacted to exact a penalty." Id.
166. See Opinion of the Justices to The Senate, 668 N.E.2d 738, 748-49 (Mass.
1996) ("In deciding whether the three constitutional protections in issue here-ex post
facto, due process, and double jeopardy-are applicable, our cases and those of the
Supreme Court of the United States have designated the distinction as that between
laws that are 'criminal and punitive, or civil and remedial.'" (quoting United States v.
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includes no statement ofremedial or equitable intent.1 67 Rather, as
applied to joint property interests, the statute clearly requires a pu
nitive forfeiture, evincing the intent of the legislature to punish.168
This interpretation is further supported by an examination of the
legislative record and the circumstances of its passage.
B.

The Legislative History Suggests that the Massachusetts Slayer
Statute was Intended to be Punitive

The legislative history and the circumstances surrounding the
passage of the Massachusetts slayer statute suggest that it was in
tended to be punitive. First, the legislature elected to include the
slayer statute in the criminal rather than the probate portion of the
. Massachusetts code. Further, as discussed below, the evolution of
the proposed legislation makes clear that the legislature could fore
see and understand that the statute would result in a forfeiture of
vested interests of surviving joint tenants and tenants in the en
tirety.1 69 Moreover, the legislative history strongly suggests that the
statute is purposefully penal in nature. 170
The statute that was passed into law in 2002 was the third draft
of a bill brought before the House addressing the slayer issue.l7l
The first draft of this legislation, House Bill 2565, was proposed on
January 3, 2001. 172 House Bill 2565 required anyone convicted of
certain types of unlawful killing to be deemed to have predeceased
the decedent for the purposes of distribution.17 3 It did not mention
joint tenancies or tenancies by the entirety at allY4
The second draft of the legislation, introduced on July 26, 2001,
again required anyone convicted of certain types of unlawful killing
to be deemed to have predeceased the decedent for the purposes of
One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362 (1984))). See generally 3 SINGER,
supra note 164, § 60.
167. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 46 (2006).
168. See generally 3 SINGER, supra note 164, § 59:1-:2 (Statutes or regulations that
impose forfeitures are penal in nature and must be strictly construed.).
169. 2A id. § 48:04 ("The events occurring immediately prior to the time when an
act becomes law comprise an instructive source, indicative of what meaning the legisla
ture intended. ").
170. 3 id. § 59:1 (The "penal character [of a statute] may apply to 'fines and im
prisonments' only, or it may include 'penalties and forfeitures' ...." (emphasis added».
171. An Act Relative to the Descent and Distribution of Property, ch. 420, § 11,
2002 Mass. Acts 1195 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 46 (2006».
172. H.R. 2565, 182d Gen. Court (Mass. 2001) (as petitioned by Rep. Sullivan,
Jan. 3,2001).
173. Id.
174. ld.
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distribution. 175 Unlike its predecessor, however, House Bill 4412
provided for joint tenants and tenants by the entiretyP6 It stated
that any person "for whom the rights of joint tenancy or tenancy by
the entirety apply," who is charged with certain types of unlawful
killing "shall be prohibited from receiving the assets of the dece
dent."l77 Importantly, this draft of the proposed legislation did not
require that a joint tenant or a tenant by the entirety be deemed to
have predeceased the decedent,178 From both the separate inclu
sion and differential treatment of joint interests, it can be inferred
that, at a minimum, the legislature recognized some differences be
tween these and other property interests. 179 The differences at is
sue, long recognized at common law, are those attendant to the
statutory right of survivorship.180 First, a surviving joint tenant
takes the entire property in fee by operation of the right of survi
vorship rather than through probate. 181 Second, the property in
terests germane to joint tenants include both a present vested one
half interest and a future expectancy interest. 182 A legislative
knowledge of this second difference is reflected in other areas of
Massachusetts law.1 83
The third draft of the legislation, House Bill 5136, proposed on
June 12, 2002, contained the language that eventually became the
enacted Massachusetts slayer statute. 184 Like House Bill 4412,
175. H.R. 4412, 182d Gen. Court (Mass. 2001) (as reported by J. Comm. on the
Judiciary, July 26, 2001).
176. Id.
177. Id. (emphasis added). Presumably, this is referring to the statutory right of
survivorship.
178. Id.
179. See Meunier's Case, 66 N.E.2d 198, 200 (Mass. 1946) (in construing a statute,
"[n]one of its words is to be rejected as surplusage"); 2A SINGER, supra note 164,
§ 47:37 ("The existence of surplus words should never be presumed.").
180. See supra section III.C.
181. TIFFANY, supra note 34, § 188.
182. See 2B SINGER, supra note 164, § 50:1 ("The legislature is presumed to know
the common law before a statute was enacted.").
183. The Massachusetts simultaneous death statute (MSDS) states that, in the
event of simultaneous death, joint tenancies and tenancies by the entirety are effec
tively converted into tenancies in common. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190A, § 3 (2006).
The MSDS directs that in such cases joint property "shall be distributed one half as if
one had survived and one half as if the other survived." Id. The legislature's treatment
of joint interests in this way indicates that the legislature recognized that a joint tenant
is the owner of an interest equal to that of each other joint tenant. See 2B SINGER,
supra note 164, § 51:2. Indeed, this is among the rationales used in a majority of juris
dictions that employ the severance approach in addressing slayers and joint property
interests. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
184. H.R. 5136, 182d Gen. Court (Mass. 2002).
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House Bill 5136 separately identifies joint tenancies and tenancies
by the entirety, but adds the requirement that upon conviction
these joint assets also be distributed as if "the person convicted of
the unlawful killing had predeceased the decedent."185 In light of
the legislative history and the legislature'S knowledge of the nature
and operation of joint property with the right of survivorship,186 it is
reasonable to conclude that this provision knowingly and intention
ally imposes a punitive forfeiture upon those surviving joint tenants
to whom it applies. Accordingly, the only reasonable construction
of this provision of the statute is that it is punitive by design and
penal in character.

v.

ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEMS, CONSTITUTIONAL
AND OTHERWISE, RAISED BY THE
MASSACHUSETTS ApPROACH

The differences in the Massachusetts approach are more than a
mere expression of legislative prerogative. The choice to ignore the
limits of the owned interest rationale and to pass a statute that re
sults in a punitive forfeiture makes the statute, as applied to joint
property holders, uniquely vulnerable to constitutional challenge. 187
Such an attack would most likely come on one of two fronts. The
first argument is that the statute amounts to an unconstitutional
taking in violation of the United States Constitution and potentially
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights as well as Massachusetts
common law. This is the most common argument made in other
jurisdictions whose slayer statutes are silent on the treatment of
joint property interests. 188 Second, it may be argued that due to the
punitive nature and penal character of the statute, application of
the statute amounts to a second punishment for a single crime in
violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment
185. Id.
186. Particularly as reflected in and evinced by House Bill No. 4412 and the
MSDS. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190A, § 3; H.R. 4412, 182d Gen. Court (Mass. 2001);
supra note 183.
187. Wade, supra note 10, at 721 (concluding that due process, forfeiture, corrup
tion of blood, double jeopardy, and other concerns are made moot when "a statute
prevents merely the acqUisition of property by an unlawful killing," namely, when a
statute is not punitive). See 3 SINGER, supra note 164, § 60.
188. Fellows, supra note 102, at 538-39 ("Slayers [have] frequently relied on [anti
forfeiture provisions] to argue that the slayer rule is unconstitutional. "). As applied to
joint interests, these arguments are only salient in the minority of states whose slayer
statutes do not explicitly address treatment of joint property using either the severance
or constructive trust approaches.
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of the United States Constitution 189 as well as the Massachusetts
Declaration of RightS. 190
In the absence of any reported case law analyzing the opera
tion of the Massachusetts statute, analysis of these claims must be
informed, in part, by case law and precedent from other jurisdic
tions. However, both the novelty of the Massachusetts approach
and the inherently idiosyncratic nature and variance among state
statutes and state constitutions upon which challenges to slayer stat
utes are most commonly based 191 necessitate a largely original anal
ysis of the potential constitutional arguments.
A.

Forfeiture Analysis
1.

An Analysis of Forfeiture Claims under the
Massachusetts Constitution

The most common attack levied against slayer statutes has
been that they violate constitutional prohibitions against criminal
forfeiture. 192 At a most basic level, forfeiture occurs when a person
is deprived of property because of the commission of some act. 193
Requiring a person to forfeit property as a result of having been
convicted of a crime is generally disfavored under the law of the
189. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall any person be subject for the same of
fence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ....").
190. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969) (holding that double jeop
ardy clause protections extend to state prosecutions under the Fourteenth Amend
ment's Due Process Clause); supra note 13 for discussion of the Massachusetts common
law prohibition on double jeopardy.
191. For example, the Massachusetts Constitution is idiosyncratic in that it lacks
an anti-forfeiture provision. Massachusetts is in a small minority of states lacking such
a provision. Fellows, supra note 102, at 538 n.147; see, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 19;
ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 15; ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 16; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 9; COLO.
CONST. art. II, § 9; CONN. CONST. art. IX, § 4; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 15; FLA. CONST. art.
I, § 17; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1 <J( XX; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 11; IND. CONST. art. I, § 30;
KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 12; Ky. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 20; ME. CONST. Art I,
§ 11; MD. CONST. Dec. of Rights art. 27; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 10; MINN. CONST. art. I,
§ 11; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 30; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 30; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 15; N.C.
CONST. art. I, § 29; OHIO CONST. Art I, § 12; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 15; OR. CONST. art.
I, § 25; PA. CONST. art. I, § 19; S.c. CONST. art. I, § 4; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 12; TEX.
CONST. art. I, § 21; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 15; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 18; WIS. CONST.
Art I, § 12.
192. Fellows, supra note 102, at 539-40; see also, e.g., Welsh v. James, 95 N.E.2d
872, 875 (Ill. 1950), overruled in part by Bradley v. Fox, 129 N.E.2d 699 (Ill. 1955).
193. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 677 (8th ed. 2004) (defining forfeiture as
"[t]he loss of a right, privilege, or property because of a crime, breach of obligation, or
neglect of duty").
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United States. 194 As discussed above, criminal forfeiture and other
conditions of attainder have been soundly rejected by both state
and federal legislatures since the country's founding. 195 The Consti
tution of 1787 itself contains multiple prohibitions against attain
der. 196 Even prior to the ratification of that document, the
constitutions of at least four states, including Massachusetts, con
tained similar prohibitions. 197 Through subsequently passed state
constitutions and statutes in the period following ratification in
1787, "American legislatures effectively laid criminal forfeiture to
rest for the next two centuries."198
While the owned interest rationale has been utilized to shield
pure expectancy interests from claims that they amount to prohib
ited criminal forfeitures,199 such claims continue to find traction
194. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, c1. 2. (prohibiting the federal judiciary from
imposing forfeiture or corruption of blood as a punishment for treason except during
the life of the person who committed the treason).
195. It is important to note that constitutional prohibitions against attainder and
forfeiture do not act as an absolute bar to requiring a convicted person to forfeit prop
erty as punishment for committing a crime. In the 1970s, statutes like the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) resurrected property forfeiture as a
method of penalizing those convicted of criminal acts. Racketeer Influenced and Cor
rupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2000». However, these modern forfeiture statutes generally
steer clear of constitutional prohibitions by requiring that the property forfeited bear
some relationship to the crime committed. See Vines, supra note 108, at 805. Such in
rem forfeitures are considered civil rather than criminal in nature under the theory that
the underlying action is against the piece of property that was used in the commission of
a crime, or acquired as the result of criminal activity, rather than against the person who
owns the property. See Waterloo Distilling Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 581
(1931) ("[I]t is the property which is ... held guilty and condemned as though it were
conscious instead of inanimate and insentient."). However, these fictions are unavailing
for slayer statutes as it is difficult to conceive of a situation where property owned
jointly by a slayer and his victim might have been an instrumentality of the murder as to
be itself guilty of the crime. See Myers, supra note 14, at 1025 ("[A] killer's previously
held interest in the joint tenancy property, is not the fruits of criminal activity and was
not a part of the criminal activity.").
196. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, c1. 2; Jacob Reynolds, The Rule of Law and
the Origins of the Bill of Attainder Clause, 18 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 177, 182 (2005)
(remarking on the presence of "multiple attainder clauses").
197. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 70 (1999).
198. Matthew R. Ford, Comment, Criminal Forfeiture and the Sixth Amendment's
Right to Jury Trial Post-Booker, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 1371,1403 (2007).
199. The owned interest rationale limits cognizable forfeitures to property inter
ests that are vested rather than mere expectancy interests. See Neiman v. Hurff, 93
A.2d 345, 348 (N.J. 1952); supra Part III.B. This limited application of the forfeiture
argument is attributable to the general acceptance of this rationale that has curtailed
what amounts to a forfeiture. See Nat'l City Bank of Evansville v. Bledsoe, 144 N.E.2d
710, 716 (Ind. 1957) (holding that imposition of a constructive trust would circumvent
constitutional problems that would be created by divesting the surviving-murderer
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when parties seek to extend the scope of slayer statutes to vested
property interests such as those attendant to jointly held
property.2oo
In states where the disfavor of criminal forfeiture is constitu
tionally expressed, courts have read constitutional prohibitions as
precluding the statutory divestment of a surviving joint tenant's
vested property interest. 201 For example, in the Kansas case In re
Estate of Shields ,202 Victoria Shields was convicted of killing her
husband. 203 Prior to his death, Victoria and her husband had
owned property as joint tenants with a right of survivorship.204 In
an action for determination of the distribution of the property, the
couple's two children claimed that, pursuant to the Kansas slayer
statute, their mother had lost all interest in the joint property.205
Victoria claimed that she retained one-half ownership in the joint
property and argued that denial of her vested interest would be an
spouse of all legal title to joint property). Prior to the acceptance of this rationale,
however, constitutional arguments based on forfeiture concerns were made more
broadly. See, e.g., Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 106 N.E. 785, 790 (III. 1914); McAllister v. Fair,
84 P. 112, 113(Kan. 1906); 5 TIFFANY, supra note 42, § 1378.
200. See Gallimore v. Washington, 666 A.2d 1200, 1213 (D.C. 1995); Shields v.
Shields (in re Estate of Shields), 574 P.2d 229, 233 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977), affd, 584 P.2d
139 (Kan. 1978); Pannone v. McLaughlin, 377 A.2d 597, 600 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977).
These cases arise only in the minority of states whose statutes do not specifically pro
vide for the post-slaying disposition of joint property in their slayer statutes. See, e.g.,
D.C. CODE § 19-320 (2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-1-5 (1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-513
(2005). The majority of state slayer statutes do so provide. See ALA. CODE § 43-8-253
(LexisNexis 1991) (severance); ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.803 (2006) (severance); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2803 (2005) (severance); CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 250-54 (West 2002
& Supp. 2008) (severance); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-803 (West 2005) (sever
ance); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.802 (West 2005) (severance); HAW. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 560:2-803 (LexisNexis 2005) (severance); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-803
(1998) (severance); MICH. CaMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2803(2)(b) (West 2002) (severance);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-813(3)(b) (2007) (severance); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2354
(1995) (severance); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 38:7-1.1 (West 2007) (severance); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 45-2-803 (West 2003) (severance); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-6(a), (b) (2007) (con
structive trust); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.455-.555 (2007) (severance); S.c. CODE ANN.
§ 62-2-803 (1987 & Supp. 2007) (severance); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-803 (2004)
(severance); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-1-106 (2007) (severance); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75
2-803(3)(b) (Supp. 2008) (severance); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 854.14 (West 2002 & Supp.
2007) (severance).
In states with ambiguous statutes, courts have sometimes been urged, mostly by
heirs standing to inherit, to construe general bars against inheritance as divesting all
property held jointly. See, e.g., Shields, 574 P.2d at 233; Pannone, 377 A.2d at 602.
201. Pannone, 377 A.2d at 602.
202. Shields, 574 P.2d at 229.
203. Id. at 230.
204. Id.
205. Id.; see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-513 (2005).
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unconstitutional contravention of Section 12 of the Kansas Bill of
Rights, which provided that "[n]o conviction within the state shall
work a forfeiture of estate."206 Based on the conclusion that "[t]he
loss by the survivor of his or her vested interest . . . would . . .
constitute a[n unconstitutional] forfeiture, the court sidestepped
that possibility by refusing to give the slayer statute such an ef
fect."207 In Shields, the court held that constitutional prohibitions
against forfeiture prevented exactly what the Massachusetts statute
affirmatively requires-divestment of vested property rights for the
conviction of a crime. 208
In light of cases like Shields, it seems that the Massachusetts
statute, as drafted, would be a priori impermissible. 209 However,
Massachusetts, unlike Kansas, has not expressed the disfavor of
criminal forfeiture constitutionally.210 This omission largely under
mines the most common type of claim made against slayer stat
utes-that they violate state constitutional provisions. However,
the lack of such a provision in the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights does not necessarily insulate the slayer statute from at
tack. 211 First, there is much evidence that state common law has
long prohibited criminal forfeitures and that this law has not been

206. Shields, 574 P.2d at 230-31 (quoting KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 12).
207. Id. at 233 (emphasis added).
208. See id. (noting that "[t]he loss by the survivor of his or her vested interest"
would be an unconstitutional forfeiture).
209. In its holding, the Shields court noted that if the legislature had "imposed [a
forfeiture] as a penalty for the felonious killing," such an act would violate the constitu
tion. Id. Unlike the Kansas statute at issue in Shields, the Massachusetts statute is not
silent or vague as to the treatment of joint interests. Compare KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59
513 (2005), with MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 46 (2006) (explicitly including joint tenants
and tenants by the entirety within the "predeceased the decedent" framework). This
precludes a construction of the statute, as utilized in the Shields case, that would miti
gate such an effect and salvage its constitutionality. See Shields, 574 P.2d at 234 (noting
that if possible, the court is required to uphold legislation by finding "any reasonable
way to construe the statute as constitutionally valid").
210. Unlike the state constitutions of a majority of states, the Massachusetts Dec
laration of Rights does not explicitly prohibit criminal forfeiture. See supra note 191.
The most comparable language in the Massachusetts Constitution appears in Article 12
of the Declaration of Rights and states that "no subject shall be ... deprived of his
property ... or deprived of his life, liberty, or estate, but by the judgment of his peers,
or the law of the land." MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XII.
211. See Gallimore v. Washington, 666 A.2d 1200, 1213 (D.C. 1995) (Schwelb, J.,
dissenting on other grounds) ("The lack of any such constitutional or statutory provi
sion does not mean ... that a forfeiture is a presumptively acceptable remedy ....").
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wholly abrogated by the statute. 212 Second, the Federal Constitu
tion contains analogous provisions that limit forfeiture of estate. 213
2.

Criminal Forfeiture and the Massachusetts Common Law

It has been suggested that in Massachusetts forfeitures based

on criminal status were prohibited long before the adoption of the
constitution in 1780.214 As early as 1641, the colonial authorities in
Massachusetts had abolished forfeitures and other attendant cir
cumstances to attainder in the Body of Liberties .215 Indeed, deci
sions of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts have
repeatedly referred to the Body of Liberties in general and to its
rejection of criminal forfeiture in particular. 216 The limited Massa
chusetts case law dealing, at least tangentially, with the slayer issue
likewise reflects an understanding of a limit to the allowable scope
of forfeiture. 217
212. See, e.g., id. at 1202 (majority opinion) (holding that, even absent a constitu
tional provision, the common law would not allow a statute to "work a forfeiture of a
murderer's preexisting property interest as the result of his conviction" (emphasis in
original».
213. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 ("No State shall ... pass any Bill of Attainder ....");
id. art. III, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of
Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture
except during the Life of the Person attainted.").
214. See Cecil Greek, supra note 30, at 119 (suggesting that "Massachusetts abol
ished escheats and forfeiture consequent to attainder in its 'The Body of Liberties of
1641' "); THE BODY OF LIBERTIES OF THE MASSACHUSETS COLLONIE IN NEW ENGLAND
(1641), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 46, 46-47 (Philip B. Kurland &
Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). This document is considered by many to be the precursor to
the General Laws of Massachusetts and the Massachusetts Constitution. GEORGE M.
JARNIS & NICHOLAS S. RACHEOTES, THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION: A CITI·
ZEN'S GUIDE 6-8 (1987).
215. 1 NATHAN DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGEMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN
LAW, WITH OCCASIONAL NOTES AND COMMENTS 147 (Boston, Cummings, Hilliard &
Co. 1823) ("By a law passed in the colony of Massachusetts A.D. 1641, it was enacted,
(among other things,) that there should be no forfeiture for, or upon death judicial.").
216. See 'TYler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 55 N.E. 812, 823 (Mass.
1900) ("Forfeiture of lands was, by the Body of Liberties of 1641, declared not to exist
in the Colony of Massachusetts ...." (citing Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422,
425, 426 (1877))). In Mink, the court stated:
In the Colony of Massachusetts, by the Body of Liberties of 1641, all lands and
heritages were declared to be free ... from all feudal burdens ... and there
has accordingly never been in Massachusetts any forfeiture upon one's death
on conviction or suicide, unless under some particular statute creating the
crime, of which no instance is remembered.
Mink, 123 Mass. at 426 (citations omitted).
217. The only two Massachusetts cases that deal with the slayer issue in any form
are Diamond v. Ganci, 103 N.E.2d 716 (Mass. 1952), and Slocum v. Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co., 139 N.E. 816 (Mass. 1923).
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In Slocum v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. ,218 the Supreme
Judicial Court applied a common law slayer rule to bar a husband
who had feloniously killed his wife from receiving the proceeds of
her life insurance policy.219 In dicta, the court noted that "[t]he
same principle of public policy" that bars a slayer from collecting
under an insurance contract would also "preclude[] him from
claiming under the statute of descent and distribution. "220 To sup
port its assertion, the court invoked the now-familiar common law
maxim that no one should be permitted to profit from his own
wrong. 221 The court further justified its conclusion by noting that
the defendant could permissibly be deprived of property in which
he possessed only an expectancy interest and "no vested right in the
proceeds. "222 In the court's brief discussion of descent and distribu
tion, it cited to two cases from other jurisdictions that also base
their finding of constitutionality upon the owned interest ratio
nale. 223 While the court did not ultimately consider constitutional
issues in its decision, its concern for the vested character of prop
erty does imply a recognition of some limit on criminal
forfeiture. 224
This same concern about impermissible forfeiture is implied in
the only other Massachusetts case dealing directly with the slayer
issue. 225 In Diamond v. Ganci, a mortician sued a husband who had
218. Slocum, 139 N.E. at 816.
219. Id. at 817 ("[A] person who commits murder, or any person claiming under
him or her, ... to benefit by his or her criminal act, would no doubt be contrary to
public policy." (quoting Cleaver v. Mut. Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 1 O.B. 147, 152-53
(1892))).
220. Id. at 818.
221. See id. at 817.
222. Id. The court stated:
In a policy which permits the insured to change the beneficiary, the latter
has no vested interest in the money to be paid, but only an expectancy. It is
clear from the terms of the present policy that Miller had no vested right in the
proceeds as against the company.
Id. (citations omitted).
223. Id. (citing Perry v. Strawbridge, 108 S.W. 641,643 (Mo. 1908) (holding that
while forfeiture for conviction of a crime had been banned by the state constitution, the
surviving husband never acquired an estate in this property, and therefore there was
nothing upon which this constitutional provision could operate"); Box v. Lanier, 79
S.W. 1042, 1047 (Tenn. 1904) (holding that the lack of a vested interest in the property
in question rendered inapplicable the state constitutional anti-forfeiture clause as well
as "sections 9, 10, art. 1, of the federal Constitution")).
224. If wholesale forfeiture were indeed permissible by law, such a concern would
be baseless.
225. See Diamond v. Ganci, 103 N.E.2d 716 (Mass. 1952).
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killed his wife for the cost of the deceased wife's burial expenses. 226
At the time of the wife's death, her only asset was her interest in
property held with her husband as a tenancy by the entirety.227
Subsequent to killing his wife, the husband "signed an instrument
purporting to be a trust" into which he transferred all the funds
produced by a foreclosure sale of the jointly owned property.228 In
its analysis, the Supreme Judicial Court noted that determination of
whether these assets were reachable by the mortician "depend[ed]
upon the effect to be given the rule of public policy which prevents
a murderer from profiting by his own wrong."229 Acknowledging
that the husband, as a tenant by the entirety, had a present interest
in "'possession and control of the granted premises, together with
the use and the profits therefrom'" that was vested under the origi
nal deed creating the tenancy po the court held that "the least bene
ficial interest" that could be considered retained by the husband is
his "life interest, of which he would not have been deprived by the
principle under consideration."231 Thus, the court explicitly recog
nized that forfeiture of a vested interest is beyond the scope of an
equitable rule that seeks to prevent a person from profiting from
his wrong. 232
These statements of the Supreme Judicial Court seem, at a
minimum, to evince a common law understanding that there are
limits to the permissibility of forfeiture. It has been held that such a
common law understanding, even absent a specific constitutional
prohibition against forfeiture, is sufficient to preclude a slayer stat
ute from requiring a surviving joint tenant to forfeit her vested in
terest in joint property.233 In Gallimore v. Washington, the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed a trial court's construction
of the applicable slayer statute. 234 The lower court had held that a
murderous joint tenant was to be treated as if he had predeceased
his victim-losing any interest in the property held jointly with the
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 717.

at 718.
(quoting Franz v. Franz, 32 N.E.2d 205, 208 (Mass. 1941)).
(emphasis added).
The court approached forfeiture directly, noting that "[b]efore the wife's
death the defendant had enjoyed a life interest with the exclusive right to rents and
profits. This he did not forfeit by the murder." Id. (emphasis added).
233. Gallimore v. Washington, 666 A.2d 1200 (D.C. 1995).
234. Id. (construing D.C. CODE § 19-320(a) (2001)).
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decedent. 235 In doing so, the trial court was aware of and had dis
tinguished an earlier decision in Maryland that found that such a
result would violate that state's constitutional prohibition against
criminal forfeiture. 236 The trial court stated that the Maryland pre
cedent was inapplicable because "the District [of Columbia] has no
such constitutional provision. "237
Notwithstanding this absence, the Court of Appeals over
turned, finding that, because such government action was prohib
ited at common law, the lack of any such constitutional or statutory
provision did not indicate that forfeiture is "presumptively accept
able. "238 Associate Judge Schwelb, dissenting on other grounds,
stressed that while there is universal acceptance of the maxim that
one should not be permitted to profit from one's own wrong, an
other closely held maxim in the law, that "equity abhors forfeit
ures,"239 belies any presumptive acceptability of a criminal
forfeiture. 24o He added that "[s]tatutes or regulations which impose
forfeitures . . . are penal in nature and must be strictly
construed."241
Based on the reasoning in the Gallimore decision, it would
seem that Massachusetts's lack of a specific constitutional provision
prohibiting forfeitures does not completely insulate its slayer stat
ute from attack.242 The Gallimore court's ultimate refusal to give
the District of Columbia's slayer statute that effect turned not on
the use of state constitutional provisions to invalidate a statute, but
rather on a finding that the statute, as written, did not abrogate the
common law understanding that joint tenants have a vested interest
in property held jointly.243 The court reasoned that the statute's
punitive effect, clear in light of this common law understanding,
could not be considered reasonable absent equally clear punitive
intent on the part of the legislature. 244 Since the court found no
clear punitive intent either in the legislature or in the common law,
235. Id. at 1202.
236. See Pannone v. McLaughlin, 377 A.2d 597, 602 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977).
237. Gallimore, 666 A.2d at 1213 (Schwelb, J., dissenting).
238. [d. at 1208-09, 1213 (majority opinion).
239. Id. at 1213; see also Jones v. N.Y. Ouar. & Indem. Co., 101 U.S. 622, 628
(1880) ("Equity abhors forfeitures.").
240. Gallimore, 666 A.2d at 1213 (Schwelb, J., dissenting on other grounds).
241. Id.
242. Id. ("The lack of any such constitutional or statutory provision does not
mean ... that a forfeiture is [aJ presumptively acceptable remedy.").
243. Id. at 1202 (holding "that the common law, at least with respect to the cur
rent problem, is not displaced by the statute").
244. Id. at 1208-09.
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the court construed the statute in part by imputing common law
limitations on forfeiture notwithstanding the plain language of the
statute. 245
Like the court in Gallimore, the common law of Massachusetts
suggests that criminal forfeiture of vested interests is an unreasona
ble and undesirable outcome of legislation. 246 Therefore, if the
Massachusetts slayer statute cannot reasonably be construed as an
intentional abrogation of the common law right of slayers to be free
from punitive forfeitures,247 it must not be given this effect.248
However, the explicitness of the Massachusetts statute, its lack of
conduciveness to creative construction, as well as the evidence sug
gesting that the legislature did in fact intend the statute to be puni
tive, may make this type of construction possible.
In sum, just as the unique nature of the Massachusetts slayer
statute249 would make it particularly vulnerable to claims of an un
constitutional forfeiture under the constitutions of a majority of
states, the absence of an explicit provision forbidding criminal for
feitures in the Massachusetts Constitution250 largely precludes the
type of state constitutional attack most commonly mounted against
slayer statutes-that they require impermissible forfeiture based
solely on state constitutions and state laws. 251 Nonetheless, the
statute's explicit attempt to cancel a slaying tenant's entire interest
245. Id. at 1202.
246. See Diamond v. Ganci 103 N.E.2d 716, 718 (Mass. 1952); Slocum v. Metro.
Life Ins. Co., 139 N.E. 816, 818 (Mass. 1923).
247. It is important to note that the legislature has passed statutes requiring for
feiture in limited circumstances. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 47 (2006). However,
in these statutes the legislature has been unquestionably explicit so as to abrogate any
common law understandings. See id. § 47(a) ("The following property shall be subject
to forfeiture to the commonwealth and all property rights therein shall be in the com
monwealth ....").
248. Wilson v. Grace, 173 N.E. 524,528 (Mass. 1930) (noting that if a "statute is a
complete reversal of the common law as understood in this commonwealth ... it cannot
be presumed that such a statute was intended to go beyond the purpose manifested by
its words" (internal quotations omitted». See generally 3 SINGER, supra note 164,
§ 61:2. While a statute may abolish a common law right, "there is a presumption that
the legislature has no such purpose." Id. § 61:1. If such a right is to be taken away, "it
must be noted clearly by the legislature." Id. Common law jurisdictions synchronize
statutory law with common law rules and maxims. "In some cases the scope of the
statute may be extended, and in others reduced." 2B id. § 50:02 (emphasis added).
249. The Massachusetts slayer statute is unique both in its explicit language re
quiring forfeiture and the way in which this language evinces a punitive intent on the
part of the legislature. See supra Part IV.
250. The Massachusetts Constitution is unique in its lack of an anti-forfeiture pro
vision. See Fellows, supra note 102, at 539 n.147.
251. Id.
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in a joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety may make it vulnerable
to constitutional attacks previously underutilized by those challeng
ing slayer statutes.
3.

Analysis of the Constitutionality of the Massachusetts
Statute Based on Federal Constitutional
Provisions

As discussed, the Federal Constitution contains provIsIOns
analogous to state constitutional bars against forfeiture. 252 While
slayer statutes have most commonly been attacked on state consti
tutional grounds,253 a number of cases have cited federal constitu
tional provisions as additionally limiting state power to pass slayer
statutes that require forfeiture. 254 While a number of state courts
have suggested in their holdings that federal constitutional provi
sions barring forfeiture and attainder might be applicable,255 the
United States Supreme Court has yet to consider an attack of state
slayer rules based on federal constitutional principles barring forfei
ture and attainder. 256 However, given that the vast majority of case
law suggests that the Massachusetts statute, as drafted, would be
presumptively unconstitutional under all analogous state constitu
tional prohibitions against forfeiture,257 its susceptibility to attack
under the Federal Constitution is high.
252. u.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 ("No State shall ... pass any Bill of Attainder ....");
id. art. III, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of
Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture
except during the Life of the Person attainted.").
253. Fellows, supra note 102, at 538-39. This is most likely due to the fact that
property law is governed by state rather than federal statute. See Egelhoff v. Egelhoff,
532 u.S. 141, 160 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting the state-unique nature of
slayer statutes).
254. E.g., Moore v. Moore, 168 S.E.2d 318, 320-21 (Ga. 1969) (considering fed
eral provisions applicable though ultimately rejecting claims under them); Misenheimer
v. Misenheimer, 325 S.E.2d 195, 198 (N.C. 1985) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1).
255. See, e.g., State v. Lincoln, 49 N.H. 464, 469 (1870) (suggesting that the Fed
eral Constitution is applicable in the area of forfeiture by stating that "in the United
States generally, there can be no forfeiture of estate or goods, as a punishment for
crime," despite the absence of an explicit constitutional prohibition against forfeiture in
a state constitution); Misenheimer, 325 S.E.2d at 198 n.2.
256. Fellows, supra note 102, at 539 n.147.
257. Under the rationale expressed in the Pannone and Shields decisions for ex
ample, the Massachusetts statute would be unconstitutional per se in a jurisdiction that
had such constitutional protection. See Shields v. Shields (In re Estate of Shields), 574
P.2d 229 (Kan. App. 1977), affd, 584 P.2d 139 (Kan. 1978); Pannone v. McLaughlin,
377 A.2d 597, 602 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977); discussion supra notes 226-234 and ac
companying text.
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Federal constitutional prohibitions against attainder and forfei
ture of estate, like those adopted by states, were adopted to pro
hibit punishment based solely on an individual's criminal status as a
convicted felon rather than for the crime committed. 258 Given that
the central organizing principle behind the slayer rule and slayer
statutes generally is the equitable maxim that wrongdoers should be
prevented from profiting from their own wrong, it would seem that
all forfeitures resulting from application of such a rule must be
based on criminal status-that is, status as wrongdoer-and are,
therefore, unconstitutional,259
However, courts have not found all applications of slayer rules
unconstitutional per se. In fact, in most cases, courts have found
constitutional prohibitions inapposite to the application of slayer
statutes by interpreting such statutes as nonpunitive and not result
ing in a cognizable forfeiture of a vested property interest.26o
Again, utilization of the owned interest rationale addresses these
potential federal constitutional vulnerabilities, not by arguing that
application is not based on the status of the slayer but by holding
that no punishment is being applied. 261 However, given the Massa
258. Fellows, supra nult; 102, at 544.
259. Id.
260. See, e.g., Weaver v. Hollis, 22 So. 2d 525, 529 (Ala. 1945) ("The exclusion of
the murderer from the property benefit does not inflict upon him any greater or other
punishment for his crime than the law specifies, and takes no property from him." (em
phasis added»; Moore v. Moore, 168 S.E.2d 318, 320 (Ga. 1969). In Moore, the court
rejected
the contention that a conviction of the crime of murder will automatically
work a forfeiture of the right of the convicted person to inherit from the per
son killed[,] ... the contention that the statute in question is void as being in
violation of Art. I, Sec. X, Par. I of the Constitution of the United States ... ,
or that it operates to deprive a murderer of his property without due process
of law, or that that statute is in violation of the 14th Amendment to the Con
stitution of the United States of America ... [or] the contention that a convic
tion in such a case would work corruption of blood or forfeiture of property in
violation of Par. III, Sec. II, Art. I of the Constitution of the State of Georgia
.... [because a]t the time of the death of the deceased in this case, the wife
had no vested interest in his estate, upon which the constitutional prohibition
against forfeiture could operate
Id. (citations omitted); Nat'l City Bank of Evansville v. Bledsoe, 144 N.E.2d 710, 716
(Ind. 1957). The Bledsoe court stated that
Many states, including Indiana, have provided by statute that the murderer
shall not inherit from his victim. These statutes would be unconstitutional if
they imposed a forfeiture of property as a penalty for the murder. The stat
utes, however, have uniformly been upheld, since they merely prevent the
murderer from profiting by his act.
Id.
261. See Moore, 168 S.E.2d at 320-21.
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chusetts statute's explicit attempt to exact a criminal forfeiture from
murderous joint tenants and tenants by the entirety262 and the evi
dence of the legislature's punitive intent, such an interpretation is
unavailable in the case of the Massachusetts slayer statute.
By its action, the Massachusetts legislature passed a law that
requires a punitive forfeiture (takes away the vested property inter
ests of surviving joint tenants and tenants by the entirety) based on
that person's criminal status (having been convicted of killing a co
tenant). This action falls squarely within the prohibition against a
state passing any bill of attainder. 263 As such, the Massachusetts
slayer statute violates the Federal Constitution.
B.

Twice Punished: The Uniquely Punitive Nature of the
Massachusetts Statute Brings it Within the Purview of the
Fifth Amendment Guarantee Against
Double Jeopardy

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment guaran
tees that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."264 This guarantee applies as
against both federal and state legislation. 265 The Double Jeopardy
Clause has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to provide crim
inal defendants protection against both reprosecution for the same
offense after acquittal or conviction,266 and multiple punishments
for the same offense. 267 Double jeopardy challenges to slayer stat
utes are exceedingly rare, and no attack based on this clause has
been successful,268 This omission is attributable to the fact that,
262. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 46 (2006).
263. See Pierce v. Carskadon, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 234, 239 (1873) ("[A state] act, in
depriving the defendants for past misconduct, and without judicial trial, of an existing
right, [is] subject to constitutional inhibition against the passage of bills of attainder.");
see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § to.
264. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Supreme Court has held that the term "life or
limb" is not to be considered literally but is to be construed to include fines and other
punishments. See Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 155 (1977).
265. See supra note 190.
266. Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498 (1984) (The Double Jeopardy Clause
"protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects
against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction." (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977))).
267. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 728-29 (1969) (Douglas, J., dis
senting) (noting that "[i]t is well established at an early date that the Fifth Amendment
was designed to prevent an accused from running risk of 'double punishment' ").
268. One case where such an argument was attempted is In re Estate of Congdon,
309 N.W.2d 261, 270 (Minn. 1970). In that case the double jeopardy charge was re
jected because the proceeding governing the distribution of assets was not considered
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whether by plain language269 or by construction,21° legislatures and
courts have been emphatic in their insistence that slayer statutes are
equitable rather than punitive measures and as such do not fulfill
the conditions precedent to a double jeopardy charge. 271 However,
because the Massachusetts slayer statute expressly requires a puni
tive criminal forfeiture of vested joint interests and is located within
the criminal code, it is vulnerable to attack under the Double Jeop
ardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment in a way that other state stat
utes are not.
The first step in determining whether a statute violates the pro
hibition on double jeopardy is to determine whether it is puni
tive. 272 The Supreme Court has held that the Double Jeopardy
Clause only bars the imposition of more than one punishment for
the same offense if each punishment is criminal rather than civil in
nature. 273 Determination of a statute's criminal or civil nature, in
turn, is based on apparent legislative intent-whether express or
implied-to establish a civil or criminal penalty or, in the alterna
tive, a determination of "'whether the statutory scheme was so pu
nitive either in purpose or effect' [so] as to 'transfor[m] what was
clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.' "274
Determining legislative intent at the outset is "a matter of stat
utory construction. "275 What is absolutely clear from the plain lan
guage of the Massachusetts statute is that the legislature, at a
minimum, intended to affect the interests of slayers in property, in
cluding property held jointly or by the entirety.276 As discussed, the
legislative history makes apparent that during the development of
the statute, the legislature was aware that the statute would void
punitive by the court. Id. The court noted that "[i]t is well established that the prohibi
tion against double jeopardy does not preclude separate civil and criminal proceedings
based on the same incident." Id.
269. See supra note 164, and accompanying text.
270. See Gallimore v. Washington, 666 A.2d 1200, 1208-09 (D.C. 1995) (refusing
to impute a punitive intent to the legislature).
271. See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997) (noting that the first step
to establishing a double jeopardy claim is to determine that the legislature intended a
punitive effect).
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. (second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting United States
v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980); Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154
(1956».
275. Id.; see also Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250,261 (2001) ("[W]hether an Act is
civil or punitive in nature is initially a question of statutory construction." (citing Kan
sas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997))).
276. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 46 (2006); see supra Part IV.
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vested joint property interests, resulting in a criminal forfeiture. In
light of these facts, a reasonable construction of the slayer statute
suggests that the legislature intended, if not expressly than certainly
impliedly, for the statute to be punitive. 277 The inclusion of the
statute in the state's criminal, rather than civil, code further bolsters
the conclusion that the legislature intended to create a criminal
penalty. There is, however, some competing evidence that the ini
tial organizing principle behind the legislature's action was equita
ble. 278 Therefore it is necessary to extend the analysis beyond plain
language to consider the statute's effect.
When, as here, there is some ambiguity as to whether the ex
press or implied legislative intent was solely punitive, a statute that
is "'so punitive either in purpose or effect'" will trigger double
jeopardy protection.279 In determining whether such a threshold
has been crossed, the Supreme Court has suggested a list of factors
to consider. They are:
(1) "[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or
restraint"; (2) "whether it has historically been regarded as a
punishment"; (3) "whether it comes into play only on a finding of
scienter"; (4) "whether its operation will promote the traditional
aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence"; (5) "whether
the behavior to which it applies is already a crime"; (6) "whether
an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is
assignable for it"; and (7) "whether it appears excessive in rela
tion to the alternative purpose assigned. "280

Under these factors, the Massachusetts legislature's intent to
punish becomes even clearer. Criminal forfeiture is clearly a sanc
tion that amounts to an affirmative disability. Indeed it is one that
has been regarded as punishment throughout history.281 The stat
ute's limit on the bar to succession to first- and second-degree mur
277. See supra Part IV.
278. See Cheryl A. Jacques, Senator, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Fact
Sheet, Amendment to House Bill 5136: An act Relative to the Descent and Distribution
of Property (July 22, 2002) (on file with author) (noting that the legislation was pro
posed to prevent persons from profiting from their own wrong).
279. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Ward,
448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980».
280. Id. at 99-100 (alteration in original) (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,
372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963».
281. The penal nature of deprivation of property has been commented upon
throughout the history of the slayer issue. See, e.g., Gallimore v. Washington, 666 A.2d
1200 (D.C. 1995) (a recent case suggesting that forfeiture of the right to inherit would
be a penalty); Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 106 N.E. 785, 789-90 (Ill. 1914) (an early case noting
the same).
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der and manslaughter, excluding vehicular homicide and negligent
manslaughter, evinces the importance of a finding of scienter. 282 A
forfeiture under such circumstances will clearly promote retribution
and deterrence. As early as the seminal slayer case of Riggs v.
Palmer, such goals were germane to preventing a slayer from inher
iting. 283 The behavior that triggers the statute, unlawful killing, is
certainly already a crime, perhaps the oldest crime. 284 For sure, an
alternate purpose may be found in the equitable demands of
preventing one from profiting from one's own wrong, but equity is
poorly served, either conceptually or legally, through the type of
punitive forfeiture demanded by the statute. 285 In overreaching the
limits of equity, the Massachusetts statute drifts from civil forfei
ture, which does not trigger double jeopardy scrutiny, into the
realm of criminal forfeiture, which does. 286 In sum, the Massachu
setts slayer statute is criminally punitive such that it triggers protec
tions provided by the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Finally, these separate punishments for the same offense are
being applied at separate judicial proceedings. The Supreme Court
has held that multiple proceedings are required to trigger double
282. A finding of scienter refers to a requirement that a given offense must be
committed with a guilty mind. See BLACK'S, supra note 193 (defining scienter as "1. A
degree of knowledge that makes a person legally responsible for the consequences of
his or her act or omission; the fact of an act's having been done knowingly, esp. as a
ground for civil damages or criminal punishment"). Such a mens rea requirement is
common in statutes that are criminal in nature. See Morissette v. United States, 342
U.S. 246 (1952) (noting that due to the importance of mens rea to our criminal justice
system, courts apply a presumption against strict liability in such cases). Each underly
ing offense triggering liability under the Massachusetts slayer statute requires a finding
of scienter. See Commonwealth v. Sires, 596 N.E.2d 1018, 1021-22 (Mass. 1992) (in
structing the jury that indictment on either first or second degree murder requires a
showing that a killing was carried out with malice); Commonwealth v. Bouvier, 55
N.E.2d 913, 916-17 (Mass. 1944) (holding that some level of intent is required to sup
port a manslaughter charge).
283. Kathleen Reilly, Making a Killing in Real Estate: Solving the Mystery of Mur
der's Effect on Tenancy by the Entirety in New York-A Legislative Solution, 82 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 1203, 1231 (2008) ("The Riggs principle was originally adopted to pre
vent a killer motivated by greed from achieving his goal and profiting through his crime.
The killer was denied all interest in the property for reasons of deterrence.").
284. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 1 (2006).
285. See Gallimore, 666 A.2d at 1213 (Schwelb, J., dissenting) ("[E]quity abhors
forfeitures. ").
286. See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 292 (1996) (holding that "in rem
civil forfeitures are neither 'punishment' nor criminal for purposes of the Double Jeop
ardy Clause"); United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362
(1984) ("The question, then, is whether a ... forfeiture proceeding is intended to be, or
by its nature necessarily is, criminal and punitive, or civil and remedial.").
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jeopardy protection. 287 This requirement is satisfied in the case of
the statute at issue. Punishment for violation of the Massachusetts
murder statute attaches at the conclusion of the criminal trial.288
Punishment, in the form of forfeiture under the slayer statute, takes
place in a later probate proceeding. 289
The Massachusetts slayer statute, due to its uniquely punitive
nature, is an additional criminal punishment, based on the same of
fense as the underlying violations, that is applied in a separate pro
ceeding. As such, it is offensive to the Double Jeopardy Clause of
the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
CONCLUSION

The Massachusetts slayer statute requires redrafting. The cur
rent statute demands an unconstitutional forfeiture in violation of
the United States Constitution and, potentially, the Massachusetts
Constitution, as well as Massachusetts common law. Additionally,
application of the statute as drafted violates the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
These infirmities can be clearly traced to the Massachusetts legisla
ture's explicit application of the "predeceased the decedent" fiction
to joint property interests with a right of survivorship. Generally,
slayer statutes meet the very real equitable demand that "a wrong
doer be prevented from profiting from his wrong" and, as such, play
an important jurisprudential role. This equitable end is poorly
served, however, by the current Massachusetts statute.
Robert F. Hennessy

287. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997) (noting that the Double
Jeopardy Clause bars multiple prosecutions and punishments for a single crime, "only
when such occurs in successive proceedings"); Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 365-66
(1983).
288. See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 28.
289. Massachusetts requires a form to accompany a petition for appointment
when a death certificate states that the cause of death was suicide, homicide, could not
be determined, or is still pending further investigation. See Massachusetts General Pro
bate Court Form CJ-P 50, available at http://pcpfc.comlwebforms/AffofCause.pdf (last
visited Mar. 15, 2009).

